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ABSTRACT 
National and state planning documents designate public health as the lead for 
mass fatality management (MFM).  MFM planning, however, demands multiagency 
participation and full public-business-government leverage.  This thesis explores 
pathways to reach operational regional MFM capability in Ohio, but also has implications 
for MFM planning across the nation.  Survey research was conducted with three key 
MFM stakeholder groups:  county coroners, emergency management directors, and health 
commissioners.  The survey addressed realistic and actionable MFM planning by:  1) 
identifying state guidance gaps; 2) identifying local/regional operational gaps; 3) 
assessing regional resource capabilities; 4) categorizing proposed solutions to address 
identified gaps; and 5) listing legal, financial, and organizational barriers to the solutions.  
Findings show that the key stakeholder communities are confused, with a willingness to 
build MFM capacity that is accompanied by worries about who should lead and how to 
coordinate efforts.  Research recommendations include a three-sector collaboration 
(government-business-citizens) operating at the regional level and public engagement.  
Another recommendation calls for alignment of state guidance and regional operations 
with The Joint Task Force Civil Support Working Group MFM areas: command and 
control; body identification; medico-legal investigation; morgue operations; funeral 
services; final disposition; and family assistance and behavioral health services.    
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This thesis proposes to define a network of actionable recommendations for 
regional mass fatality management planning in the State of Ohio, but also has 
implications for national and other states’ planning for response and recovery.  National 
and many state planning documents designate public health as the lead coordinating 
entity for mass fatality management.  Mass fatality management (MFM) planning, 
however, demands shared multidisciplinary and multiagency participation as well as 
public input.  Active collaboration among all mass fatality management stakeholders 
must be achieved in order to develop actionable mass fatality management options at the 
regional level.  This research will assist in MFM planning by focusing on the statewide 
ability to: 
• Identify state guidance gaps 
• Identify local/regional operational gaps 
• Assess regional resource capabilities 
• Facilitate proposed solutions to address identified gaps 
• Determine a list of legal, financial, and organizational barriers to the 
solutions 
A.   PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The National Response Plan was released by the Department of Homeland 
Security (2004a) as an all-discipline, all-hazards plan intended to establish a single, 
comprehensive framework for managing domestic incidents.  It was recently revised to 
the National Response Framework (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2008a), 
further defining key principles, roles, and structures that organize the way that this nation 
responds to emergencies and disasters.  The Public Health and Medical Services Annex, 
Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8 in the National Response Framework, was 
developed to provide coordinated federal assistance to supplement state, local, and tribal 
response to public health and medical care needs.  Functionality for mass fatality events 
is included in this annex, but planners and practitioners with expertise in mass fatality are 
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concerned that ESF 8 lacks the strategic and operational acumen necessary to address 
fatality management adequately at mass-fatality incidents and operations that exceed 
traditional scene-based thinking and enter into the realm of tens of thousands (Gursky, 
2007, p. 3; Northern Command and Department of Health and Human Services 
[NORTHCOM and DHS], 2006a, p. 2).  Fatality Management is a Response Mission 
within the Target Capabilities List and is defined as:   
The capability to effectively perform…transportation, storage, 
documentation, and recovery of forensic and physical evidence;  
identification of the fatalities using scientific means; certification of the 
cause and manner of death; processing and returning of human remains 
and personal effects of the victims to the legally authorized person(s); and 
interaction with and provision of legal, customary, compassionate, and 
culturally competent required services to the families of deceased within 
the context of the family assistance center…through a unified command 
structure (DHS, 2007b, p. 571). 
The 1918 pandemic influenza (PI) surged in three waves, claiming the lives of 50 
to 100 million people worldwide, with over 675,000 recorded deaths in the United States 
(Gursky, 2007, p. 1).  Pandemic influenza has been a pressing topic for public health and 
national preparedness and response in recent years.  Based on predicted death modeling 
for a 1918-like PI outbreak combined with a non-geographically centered effect (i.e., 
pandemics will affect the nation and globe with nearly parallel waves of resource 
demand), a traditional mass fatality approach cannot and will not build sufficient 
capability.  The current national response teams for mass fatality, organized under 
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT), were created to respond to 
large airplane disasters (n = 250), not pandemics (National Disaster Medical System, 
n.d.).  The specter of PI puts local communities and their death care infrastructure on the 
hook to figure out an action plan for compassionate body disposition.   
This type of non-traditional mass fatality planning has not yet been synchronized 
with actionable plans.  Communities and operational disaster planning teams are, 
understandably, pre-disposed to save lives versus dealing with death.  Even when their 
attention is turned to death, planning efforts address mass fatality in terms of the 
traditional hundreds (e.g., the DMORT model) with the assumed availability of external 
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partnering and resources in their time of need.  To further complicate matters, the topic of 
death and matters associated with the dignified disposal of tens of thousands of bodies is 
not a particularly popular one in the United States society-at-large, in the strategic 
disaster planning community, or, most certainly, with policy and decision makers that 
include elected and appointed officials.   
Recently, an Ohio workgroup under the guidance of the Ohio Emergency 
Management Agency (OEMA) completed and released the Acute Mass Fatalities 
Incident Response Plan (OEMA, 2007c).  This plan is the first state level document to lay 
out the responsibilities for mass fatality and bring death industry partners together.  The 
plan is an annex to the state’s emergency operation plan and details a traditional, scene-
based, DMORT-assisted definition of mass fatalities.  It is designed for a surge incident 
where local entities will most likely be able to mount a sustainable response to a 
geographically centered occurrence with assistance from pre-defined state and local 
partners.   
With the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) as the lead, mass fatality response 
and recovery is assumed as a public health function under Emergency Support Function 
(ESF) 8 at the state level (OEMA, 2007a, p. 8-1).  Responsibility for leadership and 
coordination of mass fatality at the local level, however, is not as clear-cut.  The last 
several years of state and local planning for pandemic influenza response and recovery 
have been fraught with fingers pointed in other directions as to responsibility for mass 
fatality leadership.  When it comes to the local response level, the most popular 
candidates for the ever-present question of “who’s in charge?” include the county 
coroner, county emergency management director, and the county or city health 
commissioner.  It is the health commissioner, though, who aligns with the state’s 
emergency plan as well as the national guidance for lead agent status.   
The potential Ohio mortality from PI, based on 2006 population statistics, was 
calculated through Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) modeling software 
for PI, FluAid 2.0 (CDC, 2000).  The results based on 1918-like PI modeling with a 25% 
gross attack rate (a mid-range scenario) predict a first wave of 24,090 deaths above and 
beyond normal Ohio mortality.  This calculation is 13,292 deaths beyond a sustainable 
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response to fatality surge, with current surge sustainability defined by state plans at 50% 
over and beyond the normal or between pandemics (interpandemic) baseline (Hade and 
Porter, 2006).  Such failure within the target capability for mass fatality management 
would likely equate to a public lack of confidence in governmental leadership that could 
ultimately undermine general public health efforts in all response areas if these MFM 
deficiencies are not addressed. 
While it may be true that all disaster response is “local” within the national 
disaster planning framework, recent incidents have clearly demonstrated that certain 
types of disasters quickly reach a catastrophic threshold, almost immediately exhausting 
local resources for sustainment due to surge response demand and the ensuing recovery 
period.  This is, indeed, the scenario that PI creates as the communicable disease circles 
the globe and our nation in several waves with resulting mortality surges.  If the nation, 
states, regions, and local entities do not acknowledge the need for a different type of 
approach for non-scene based mass fatality response, this country will remain 
unprepared—without the operational capability to address catastrophic mass fatalities 
realistically related to a widespread and communicable disease like PI.   
B.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The ultimate goal for this research is to assist in the development of actionable 
MFM operational planning at the intra- and interstate regional level.  To attain that goal, 
an integrated group of recommendations for regional mass fatality management planning 
will be proposed to contribute to the MFM body of knowledge.  The following research 
questions will guide the investigation into regional MFM during catastrophic surge: 
• What are the current gaps in Ohio’s guidance for fatality management?   
• What are the current gaps in fatality management operational capability at 
the local and regional levels? 
• What is the current status of fatality management surge resources (e.g., 





• What are the legal, financial, and/or organizational barriers, if any, to 
Ohio’s mass fatality management?  
• How might the information and recommendations gained from this study 
be used in other states and across the nation? 
C.   LITERATURE OVERVIEW AND CATEGORIZATION 
A review of the literature reveals a significant amount of writing related to a 
traditional mass fatality response--a response centered on planning for scene-based events 
with an initial death surge usually related to trauma.  A full review of the literature is 
found in Chapter II of the thesis.  Although materials related to mass fatality planning 
have increased over the last five years, published writing is sparse in the area of MFM 
related to catastrophic death surge that is not geo-centered (i.e., scene-based) (Connolly, 
2006; Fells, 2006; Gerber, 2007).  On the national level, the review of the literature 
reveals an increase in conventional mass fatality literature after September 11, 2001, 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and Pandemic Influenza planning efforts in 2006.  On the 
international level, the increase in mass fatality literature can be tracked to response 
efforts after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and global planning for PI.   
The International Mass Fatalities Center (2004) defines a mass fatality incident as 
“any disaster that causes loss of life and human suffering that cannot be met through 
usual individual and community resources.”  The available literature related to regional 
planning for MFM during catastrophic surge can be grouped into four major categories 
by a qualitative analysis of dominate themes:  current MFM planning and guidance 
documents at the international, state and local levels; the impact of pandemic influenza 
planning on MFM; the use of regional planning efforts to achieve surge synergy; and the 
impact of community trust on population resiliency. 
The seminal mass fatality planning literature set for catastrophic surge 
preparedness, response and recovery to date in the United States was published in 2006.  
It was produced in conjunction with the Mass Fatality Working Group convened by the 
United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in cooperation with the Department of 
Health and Human Service (HHS) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, in 2006.  The workgroup 
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included medical examiners, health care workers, mental health professionals, law 
enforcement, casket manufacturers, funeral directors, and leaders from local, state, and 
federal government.  The working group concurred that there is much yet to be 
accomplished in the area of mass fatality planning for response and recovery, particularly 
in mass fatality management related to PI, as indicated by their close-out reports.  They 
published a total of four reports after the two-day working group conference:  Morgue 
Operations, Identification and Command and Control; Funeral Services and Final 
Disposition; Scene Ops to Include Identification and Medico-Legal Protocols; and The 
Provision of Family Assistance and Behavioral Health Services (Devlin, Gavin, Lyle, and 
McGovern, 2006; NORTHCOM and HHS, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).  Each of the reports 
provides strategic guidance to help local and regional jurisdictions as well as operational 
direction for planning capabilities.  The reports’ guidance is delivered through a gap 
analysis of activities that need to be addressed by local and regional planners.   
Current state MFM plans are found in one of two vehicles:  1) annexes to the 
state’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) under ESF 8 or 2) annexes to the state’s 
pandemic influenza (PI) plans as a support operation.  For literature review purposes, 
various state plans were examined against the recommendations of the NORTHCOM-
DHS Mass Fatality Working Group.  Ohio’s current MFM planning, like the bulk of state 
plans systematically sampled during the literature review for this research, does not 
demonstrate a capability to sustain death surge in an event that demands a concurrent 
statewide MFM response.  The state’s current EOP MFM annex (OEMA, 2007c), Acute 
Mass Fatalities Incident Response Plan, relies on local jurisdictions to mount a 
sustainable response factoring in available on-scene support by state and federal partners, 
including DMORT assets.  In addition, a review of state plans on the U.S. pandemic.gov 
website reveals that MFM aligning with catastrophic surge from PI is not a front-burner 
issue for most states.  Traditional approaches in MFM operational response and recovery 
are the norm, with only cursory coverage of death issues during a pandemic (Department 
of Health and Human Services [HHS], n.d.).  Ohio’s Pandemic Plan devotes two pages to 
MFM in an 85-page document (Ohio Department of Health [ODH], 2006).   
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There is a well-known saying in the disaster response community that all 
emergencies are local.  State and federal guidance to assure and support local emergency 
management capabilities is not new, either.  The literature reveals, however, that the state 
and federal levels of government have recently increased their mandates, guidance, and 
oversight direction to assure that the national interest is protected through local 
operations and tactical effort (DHS, 2007a, 2007b, 2008b).  In addition, throughout the 
modern era of emergency management this guidance has been channeled with or without 
funding from the Federal to the state to the local level in the United States.  Current MFM 
efforts follow this tradition, based on the long-held principle that although all levels of 
government are required in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery, the local 
jurisdiction is the primary emergency manager (Gursky, 2007, p. 3).  
In the case of MFM, however, Inglesby (2006) points out that local catastrophic 
capability must include the regional level of response as the minimum level of initial 
coordination.  Regions generally have certain accepted cultural characteristics and 
geographic boundaries and tend to coincide with the service areas of the infrastructures 
that serve them (The Infrastructure Security Partnership [TISP], 2006, p. 2). There is not 
enough capability within any response locale, usually defined as the county level by the 
state, to sustain a response to catastrophic demands for mortuary resources.  Regional 
planning for MFM in Ohio most naturally corresponds with its eight homeland security 
regions, which are clusters of counties defined as regions on the basis of geographic 
boundaries and population equity. 
The preparedness and response literature is replete with admonitions regarding the 
necessity of community trust in governmental leadership concerning disasters and the 
need for community resiliency or bounce-back.  Resiliency is named as a necessity when 
it comes to community response to and recovery from PI, to include mass fatality 
(Schoch-Spana, 2008).  In addition, decision makers must demonstrate trust in the 
capabilities of their agencies and organizations in order for responders to take risks, be 




Institute, Inc., argue that the building and breaking of trust is a normal cycle in all 
organizational relationships, giving credence to the hard work of trust building in 
preparation for and during disaster.   
MFM decisions require technical knowledge and information, as well as weighing 
competing societal values.  For this reason, it is essential that the public become a part of 
these policy decisions to energize trust between authorities and the public.  Most of the 
nation’s current homeland security and health emergency policies do not adequately 
reflect the civic infrastructure’s proven contributions and capabilities in disaster planning 
(Schoch-Spana, Franco, Nuzzo and Usenza, 2007, p. 8).  Community level or population-
based level methods to cope with mass fatality can “benefit immensely from the 
community residents’ counsel and assistance in relation to the practical, cultural, 
religious, and psychological dimensions of death (Schoch-Spana et al., 2007, p. 21).  
Public and private business engagement in pre-event PI planning for value-laden 
decisions is a necessary yet currently missing part of national and state planning (Schoch-
Spana et al., 2007, p. 21).   
In summary, when addressing pandemic influenza and mass fatality management, 
the published literature would suggest that response and recovery planning is currently 
lacking, and is strategic [only] when the topic is addressed.  Although strategic guidance 
is valued and absolutely appropriate at the national and state levels, a lack of operational 
guidance with actionable recommendations forces the question of how subsequent 
operations can and will be addressed at the regional and local levels.  Also, the literature 
review reveals that the topics of regional level response and community resiliency are 
missing to date in MFM guidance and operational planning.  
D.   ARGUMENT 
The Joint Task Force Civil Support Working Group on Mass Fatality determined 
that any regional plan for mass fatality management should include the following seven 
areas for viability of response and recovery operations (Gursky, 2007, p. 4): 
• Command and control 
• Body identification 
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• Medico-legal investigation 
• Morgue operations 
• Funeral services 
• Final disposition 
• Family assistance and behavioral health services 
These seven areas for MFM viability are based on the expertise of national 
planners and death industry practitioners representing all aspects of the civilian and 
military mass fatality community, public and private.  While this workgroup may not 
represent national consensus in these early stages of MFM guidance, its 
recommendations are informed by experienced professionals and are the only national 
guidelines currently available, which specifically address catastrophic surge in any detail 
(Gursky, 2007, p. 9).  Any effort for MFM planning should ensure that the partners 
needed to accomplish operations in the seven areas have been engaged in the process 
prior to plan production, including both stakeholders and citizens.   
While the brunt of the operational response mechanisms does occur at the local 
level in jurisdictional emergency and disaster, in higher-level disaster (i.e., catastrophe), 
local jurisdictions must quickly move into multi-effort, collaborative, horizontal 
operations that challenge the traditional, vertically aligned emergency management 
system.  The reality of a catastrophic incident creates the potential for overwhelming 
mass casualty and death surge in conjunction with a need for sustained response and 
recovery.  Catastrophic capability starts at the regional level of response to address both 
public and private infrastructure service support (TISP, 2006, p. 2).  Pandemic influenza 
is such a catastrophic incident.   
Regions need to build capability for sustained resiliency and operational reality 
into disaster planning efforts posthaste.  This must happen without the usual tendencies to 
paper the process, shelve it, and respond with a best-intended effort, all the while 
counting on outside resources when the situation sours.  This traditional type of MFM is 
exactly the response currently written into most of the state planning efforts for Pandemic 
Influenza (PI).  Responders to an incident that is simultaneously affecting numerous 
communities and many states (i.e., a non-scene based incident) cannot waste time and 
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effort by counting on outside resources, state or federal, that will be required and 
competed for nationwide. There will be no nationally supported safety net in such 
circumstances (HHS, 2008, p. 12).  Communities must look to their own stakeholders and 
citizens to find ways of augmenting and expanding their PI plans in order to ensure 
sustainability.   
In summary, there should be no confidence in a traditional, scene-based approach 
to mass fatality management for catastrophic surge related to a PI incident or other 
virulent communicable disease.  A traditional model cannot be plugged and played into a 
catastrophic mass fatality environment that involves a lack of geographic boundaries and 
demands parallel-competed resources.  The planning needed to address mass fatality 
operations realistically in catastrophic surge is currently in the very early stages of 
development, even at the national and state levels.   
E.   METHODOLOGY   
A statewide survey was implemented with local leaders in MFM planning and 
operations.  Regional MFM planning constitutes action at the lowest jurisdictional effort 
during catastrophic surge, but there is no operational model for regional disaster planning 
involving MFM during catastrophic surge in Ohio.  Such a regional approach for 
response and recovery aligns most naturally with Ohio’s pre-existing eight homeland 
security (HLS) regions.  Key MFM local leaders were surveyed to determine their MFM 
awareness, to include their perceptions of MFM preparation and their knowledge of the 
potential consequences without such preparation.  
The MFM survey engaged three key stakeholder audiences involved in MFM 
under Ohio Revised Code and gathered information while raising MFM awareness.  The 
target audiences (city and county health commissioners, county emergency managers, 
and county coroners in Ohio) are the jurisdictional leaders for MFM and play important 
roles in the planning for such incidents.  They were asked to complete separate but 
aligned surveys:  Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophic Surge:  Health 
Commissioners; Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophic Surge:  County 
Emergency Managers; and Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophic Surge:  
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County Coroners. The surveys covered the seven areas for viability of response and 
recovery operations in MFM addressed in the previous Argument section, including:  
awareness of MFM definitions and concepts, unified command, local/regional 
coordination and guidance, scene and morgue operations, final disposition, family 
assistance, communication and identification of gaps in MFM planning and operations.  
The research process was approved as exempt under Category 2 on December 28, 2007, 
by The Ohio State University Institutional Review Board (IRB), Protocol #207E0871. 
The survey was sent electronically through SurveyMonkey (The SurveyMonkey 
Team, 2007) using its “List Management Tool.”  Publicly available email addresses 
through the target audiences’ respective state agency (Ohio Department of Health and 
Ohio Emergency Management Agency) or their professional organization (Ohio County 
Coroner Association) were used.   
The data was entered into a SPSS-PC database for descriptive and inferential 
statistical analysis within, between, and among the target audience groups.  The survey 
results provided the foundation for an ongoing statewide MFM regional planning process.  
F.   SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Actionable MFM solutions at the regional level will enable the local players 
responsible for catastrophic mass fatality to operate consistently, engaging their 
stakeholders and communities and using state and national guidance.  The resulting 
catastrophic mass fatality planning and the local-regional efforts to implement such 
planning will provide an operational template for other states.  It will also assure state 
capabilities and, ultimately, national homeland security attention regarding an incident 
consequence that has the negative ability to deter the public’s resiliency and confidence 
in governmental leadership during disaster, possibly impacting other response and 
recovery efforts. 
In Ohio, some counties have already begun to incorporate traditional MFM 
operations into their PI planning without regard for a regional approach or the nature of 
state and national support in a time of catastrophic surge.  These current planning 
documents will not sustain MFM efforts in an actionable and realistic way.  Such 
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inappropriate plug-and-play tactics without thorough collaborative local discussion are 
sure to set up the local response for failure, and give a false sense of security to 
communities that will quickly lose faith in their officials’ and agency heads’ ability to 
lead in crisis.  In addition, there remains the issue of which local/regional coordinating 
agency is the primary lead in MFM.  Although mass fatality response and recovery is a 
public health function under ESF 8 at both the national and state levels, there is confusion 
in the State of Ohio and across other states as to who is leading the MFM effort.  This 
confusion must be addressed to enable the collaborative leadership action needed for 
successful and sustained MFM.   
This thesis is designed to impact mass fatality management at state and national 
levels by promoting the concept of regional versus local response for catastrophic 
planning; by assisting locals to apply state and national MFM guidance at the regional 
operational level for response and recovery; and by proposing working solutions to 
engage governing entities, stakeholders, and citizens-at-large in the MFM planning 
process.  The research will add to the published literature in the area of MFM in 
catastrophic surge, an area that is sparse at this time.   
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II.   LITERATURE REVIEW  
There is perhaps nothing else so distinctive of the condition and character 
of a people as the method in which they treat their dead. 
 - William Tegg, 1876 
A review of the literature reveals a significant amount of writing related to a 
traditional mass fatality response — a response centered on planning for scene-based 
events with an initial death surge usually related to trauma.  Although literature related to 
mass fatality planning has increased over the last five years, published text is sparse in 
the area of MFM related to catastrophic surge that is not geo-centered (i.e., scene-based) 
(Connolly, 2006; Fells, 2006; Gerber, 2007).  On the national level, the review of the 
literature reveals an increase in conventional mass fatality literature after September 11, 
2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and pandemic influenza (PI) planning efforts in 2006.  
On the international level, the increase in mass fatality literature can be tracked to 
response efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and global planning for PI.   
The International Mass Fatalities Center (2004) defines a mass fatality incident as 
“any disaster that causes loss of life and human suffering that cannot be met through 
usual individual and community resources.”  The available literature related to regional 
planning for MFM during catastrophic surge can be grouped into four major categories 
by a qualitative analysis of dominate themes:  the impact of PI on MFM planning; current 
MFM planning and guidance documents at the international, state and local levels; the 
use of regional planning efforts to achieve synergy for surge capability; and the 
relationship between community trust and population resiliency. 
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A.   PANDEMIC INFLUENZA IMPACT ON MASS FATALITY 
MANAGEMENT 
1. Lessons from the Past 
The 1918 pandemic influenza (PI) surged globally in three waves, claiming the 
lives of 50 to 100 million people worldwide, with over 675,000 recorded deaths in the 
United States (Gursky, 2007, p. 1).  PI has resurfaced as a possible impending natural 
disaster and is currently a critical planning need in public health and national 
preparedness and response.  Based on predicted death modeling for a 1918 — like PI 
outbreak combined with a non-geographically centered effect (i.e., pandemics will affect 
the nation and globe with nearly parallel waves of resource demands), a traditional mass 
fatality approach cannot build or sustain sufficient capability.  The current national 
response teams for mass fatality, organized under Disaster Mortuary Operational 
Response Teams (DMORT), were created to respond to large airplane disasters (n = 250), 
not pandemics (National Disaster Medical System, n.d.).  The specter of PI puts local 
communities and their death industry infrastructure on the hook to figure out an action 
plan for compassionate body disposition and family assistance.  How bad might a 
pandemic involving influenza be?   
The CDC predicts that a “medium-level epidemic” could kill up to 
207,000 Americans, hospitalize 734,000, and sicken about a third of the 
U.S. population. Direct medical costs would top $166 billion, not 
including the costs of vaccination. An H5N1 avian influenza that is 
transmittable from human to human could be even more devastating: 
assuming a mortality rate of 20 percent and 80 million illnesses, the 
United States could be looking at 16 million deaths and unimaginable 
economic costs (Garrett, 2005, p. 2). 
During each of the 1918 death surges, the undertakers and gravediggers still well 
enough to work could not keep up with the demand, not to mention the lack of sites to 
bury the dead and the inability to attain caskets.  The resulting bodies stranded at home 
and the coffins piled high at cemeteries were potent symbols of a nation’s inability to 
carry on business as usual for population mortality and body disposition (Schoch-Spana, 
2000, p. 1412).  
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In their report to Congressional requesters, the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (2007, p. 17) openly reported challenges in coordinating preparedness for PI in 
critical infrastructure sectors.  Those challenges included significant deficits in continuity 
of operations for PI preparedness and response, a lack of clearly defined federal and state 
roles, cross-sector interdependencies, and potential legal and regulatory issues.  As the 
United Kingdom’s MFM plan clearly states, pandemic influenza demands “different 
ways of working (Home Office, 2008, p. 17).”   
2. Current Realities Regarding PI and MFM Integration 
In 2006, a two-week long California heat wave killed an estimated 140 people.  
The resulting deaths, mainly isolated in one geographic area, produced a surge of bodies 
that local officials were unable to keep up with. The heat mortality surge resulted in some 
bodies being stuffed and piled on top of others into the freezers at the Fresno County 
morgue as coroners attempted to investigate the cause of deaths of victims, many of them 
elderly and without air conditioning due to a power outage (Matire, 2006).  The reports of 
morgue pile-ups outraged the community, where piling was deemed an unacceptable 
response option post-incident.  Death, especially death occurring as a mass fatality 
incident, is not a popular topic in the U.S. planning culture.  A Washington Post (2006) 
article is entitled:  “A Grisly but Essential Issue:  Pandemic Plan Skims over How to Deal 
with Many Corpses (Connolly, 2006).”  The Pandemic Preparedness Handbook 
(Philpott, 2007, p. 39) incorporates a one paragraph entry on mortuary issues.   
The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (NSPI) (The 
White House, 2005) was released with the goals of:  (1) stopping, slowing, or otherwise 
limiting the spread of a pandemic to the United States; (2) limiting the domestic spread of 
a pandemic and disease, suffering, and death; and (3) sustaining infrastructure and 
mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of the society.  The NSPI indicates 
that, in comparison to the normal influenza mortality of 36,000, “a pandemic or 
worldwide outbreak of a new influenza virus could dwarf this impact by overwhelming 
our health and medical capabilities, potentially resulting in hundreds of thousands of 
deaths, millions of hospitalizations, and hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and 
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indirect costs (The White House, 2005, p. 1).  An annual summary to the NSPI (The 
White House, 2007b, p. 20), mentioned the topic of mass fatality once in its 36 pages, 
and only in conjunction with the admonition that awardees of Federal Pandemic 
Influenza funding are mandated to address their respective levels of MFM planning.   
Public Law No. 109-417, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
(PAHPA) was enacted in December of 2006, establishing an Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) with the Department of Health and Human Services 
along with new strategies to guide PI specific operations (ASPR, 2007, p. 1).  The 
PAHPA annual progress report does not mention mass fatality, death connected planning, 
or MFM, although mass fatality is one of the 24 criteria (Priority Seven) that all states 
were asked to address in their PI preparedness plans (ASPR, 2007, p. 12).   
States were asked for a one-page summary of the status of current MFM 
activities, the request citing alternatives to traditional body disposition and funeral 
gatherings as indicators of planning along with two evidence-based benchmarks:  1) 
demonstrate the capability to remove bodies from homes properly; and 2) demonstrate 
the ability to maintain the proper storage during a pandemic.  In January of 2007, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) asked each state’s cooperation in 
responsibly executing National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Implementation Plan 
Action #6.1.1.2. The due date for states to submit information on selected aspects of their 
PI preparedness plans was April 2007 (Official Communication from HHS: Federal 
Department Point of Contact Letter).  
No guidance for the different ways of working MFM specific to PI is provided 
within national documents.  As one surge researcher questions:  “Is the plan data based, 
trained for, and tested for  validity and operations logistics, or is it merely a written plan 
that addresses the minimal requirements mandated by various federal funding streams 
(Phillips, 2006, p. 1103)?” 
FluAid 2.0 (CDC, 2000) assists in laying out the possible impact of PI in stark 
terms:  the numbers of anticipated deaths in the program are statistically modeled on 
three previous influenza pandemics (1918, 1957, and 1968).  The statistical output 
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differentials align with one of these three pandemics in a best case 15%, most likely 25%, 
and worst case 35% scenario that factors in a case fatality rate and the gross attack rate 
(those becoming clinically ill).  This test version of software created by programmers at 
the CDC to assist state and local planners by providing estimates of potential PI impact 
specific to their locality, including deaths, hospitalizations, and outpatient visits.  Table 1 
displays the results of a FluAid 2.0 analysis on the impact of pandemic influenza, to 
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Table 1.   Pandemic Influenza Impact Estimated by FluAid 2.0 (After: CDC, 2000)1 
Although some planners (Levine, Gebbie, and Qureshi, 2007, p. 575) advocate 
alternative congregate care sites for infected individuals in public settings such as 
schools, churches, and convention centers, others are starting to promote the belief that 
                                                 
1 Ohio information is from an Ohio Department of Health (ODH) 2006 unpublished report: Pandemic 
Influenza Impact Summary for Ohio Counties. The data was produced through statistical runs by M.I. 
Meltzer, H.A. Shoemaker, and M. Kowalski using CDC’s FluAid 2.0: Beta Test Version released in 2000. 
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much of the treatment will more realistically take place within the home.  Given the 
numbers of those infected and demanding care, it is increasingly apparent that even well-
planned and staffed alternate care centers may not fully answer the PI surge needs.  Given 
the likelihood of care for PI victims within the home setting, it certainly is not a far leap 
to anticipate that many deaths will ultimately occur at home, as well. 
The following excerpt is from a 1918 scenario as reported in the Baltimore Sun 
(Smith, 2006):   
When coffins ran out, the city spent $25,000 on an emergency supply. The 
mayor asked mourners to make do with any available caskets, while 
undertakers requested they bathe and dress their relatives' bodies. Many 
funerals were held at home to avoid wider infection. 
One must remember that in 1918 death care and even viewings in the home were an 
accepted fact of life; not so in 2008. 
Although it is conservatively estimated that the State of Ohio can sustain a 50% 
surge in death registration capabilities, the number of deaths handled to include body 
disposition, funeral services, and other core elements of MFM is unknown (OEMA, 
2007c, p. 82).  An unpublished survey assessment of state morgue capacity completed in 
2007 for the Ohio Department of Health by The Ohio State University Center for 
Biostatistics found that the average number of burials, cremations, and entombments 
conducted in an average year per funeral director was around 150, with the total number 
of statewide on-site storage of remains at 11,189 (Hade and Porter, 2007, p. 3).  As 
previously demonstrated in Table 1, this storage capacity cannot sustain the additional 
deaths from a PI incident. 
In 2004, Ohio recorded 106,350 deaths (CDC, 2006).  Without using a seasonal 
death distribution, the monthly average of deaths in terms of shear numbers, then, is 8862 
(106,350/12).  Taking the 50% death registration capability for surge as a starting 
indicator, a month produces 13,293 deaths (8862 x .50 = 4431, then 4431 + 8862) in 
sustainable surge.  How does that number compare to a first wave of influenza, one of 
three waves if a 1918 scenario is repeated?  Using results from Table 1 for Ohio along 
with predictions based on a first wave (one of three), the outcome is 24,900 (75,453 x 
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.33) deaths over and beyond the baseline.  If one centers the potential first-wave death 
segment in a month’s time period, there are approximately 11,607 (24,900 – 13,293) 
deaths beyond the sustainable surge in Ohio.  In other words, 24,900 deaths is a 
catastrophic death surge that is beyond the calculated sustainable levels (13,293) of mass 
fatality for the state; the state’s capabilities have been overrun by 2x the existing 
capabilities.  In addition, this calculation assumes that death by PI is the only incident 
filling the morgues with dead bodies.  Also, the calculation is not predicated on 
absenteeism in the death industry workforce due to illness and unwillingness to show up 
for work to sustain the PI death surge operations.   
The PI figures calculated for Ohio represent death chaos — chaos that the Ohio 
Department of Health is listed for by name as the primary agency lead, as well as chaos 
for all governmental leaders and death industry infrastructure members.  The loss of 
capability for mass fatality could well equate to a public lack of confidence in 
governmental leadership, ultimately crushing general public health response and recovery 
efforts if not controlled.   
3. Summary of PI Impact on MFM 
Pandemic influenza will produce a global inundation of very sick individuals, 
most likely in waves.  Given the number of predicted deaths in a 1918-like PI outbreak, 
combined with the requirement for a non-scene or non-geographically centered response 
(i.e., pandemics will affect the U.S. and world with nearly parallel demands for resources 
specific to influenza), traditional mass fatality management practices must morph into 
different ways of working within the emergency management and death industry 
community.  Currently crafted EMACs (Emergency Management Assistance Compacts), 
IMACs (Intrastate Mutual Aid Compacts), in-state MOUs (Memorandum of 
Understandings) and other outside assistance cannot be realistically factored into local or 
state response plans.  As Secretary Leavitt repeatedly calls for in the 2008 Pandemic 
Planning update, every individual must be involved in preparing for an incident that 
affects every individual because PI demands “…the collaboration of the full range of 
stakeholders — State and local officials, public health and medical professionals, 
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religious leaders and ethicists, the business community, organized labor, non-
governmental organizations, and individuals from all walks of life (HHS, 2008, p. 2).”  
B.  PLANNING AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS 
There is a well-known saying in the disaster response community that all 
emergencies are local.  State and federal guidance to assure and support local emergency 
management capabilities is not a new concept either.  The literature reveals, however, 
that the state and federal levels of government have recently provided increased 
mandates, guidance, and oversight direction to assure that national interest is protected 
through that local level effort (DHS, 2007a, 2007b, 2008b).  Throughout the modern era 
of emergency management, this guidance has been channeled with or without funding 
from the federal to the state to the local level in the United States.   
The U.S. federal government did not become actively involved in disaster 
response until the 1930s and then did so only on an ad hoc basis, 
providing funding to repair highways and bridges damaged by natural 
disasters or building flood-control projects. During the 1950s the 
preeminent perceived risks were nuclear war and nuclear fallout, and most 
emergency management efforts were funneled into civil defense programs 
at all levels of government. During the 1960s and '70s, a number of large 
natural disasters beset the country, notably the Ash Wednesday storm 
(1962), the Alaskan earthquake (1964), Hurricane Camille (1969), and the 
San Fernando Valley earthquake (1971). Each of these events required 
federal response and recovery assistance, yet public policies governing 
emergency management continued on an ad hoc basis, with a multiplicity 
of government agencies and departments each having partial responsibility 
for or governing authority over disaster response. In 1979 the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in order to 
centralize emergency management functions at the federal level. (S. L. 
Cutter, 2005). 
Current MFM efforts follow this tradition, based on the long-held principle that 
although all levels of government are required in disaster preparedness, response, and 
recovery, the local jurisdiction is the primary emergency manager (Gursky, 2007, p. 4).  
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This literature review of current MFM planning documents starts at the 
international level.  This is an appropriate entry given the global nature of a pandemic 
outbreak such as influenza.  It underscores one of the key elements that set PI disaster 
planning apart:  worldwide omnipresence of infection in pandemic incident.  
1. International Guidance for Mass Fatality Management (MFM) 
A literature review of MFM at the international level reveals snippets of MFM 
planning within to the World Health Organization’s (WHO) mass casualty system 
planning (WHO, 2007, pp. 13, 20) calling for the necessity of dealing with death in such 
incidents.  A review of the international plans posted on WHO’s Pandemic and Epidemic 
Alert Response website reveals that separately published MFM plans are not the norm in 
international planning (WHO, 2008).  In the WHO endorsed Management of Dead 
Bodies after Disasters (Morgan and Tidball-Binz, Eds., 2006), a resource to help prepare 
for technical aspects of mass fatality post-disaster, the recommendations are approached 
traditionally.  Although the manual is a sound resource for body identification techniques, 
it does not include operational concepts for catastrophic death surge with its parallel 
demand in resources across all regions.  Indeed, there is no mention of a necessity for 
international or national MFM planning in the entirety of the WHO’s Global Influenza 
Preparedness Plan (2005). The closest language found in a single WHO objective:  “To 
prepare national authorities, other partners, and the public for a likely rapid progression 
of events, additional contingency measures, and disruptions to normal life.”   
2. The United Kingdom 
The Home Office of the United Kingdom (U.K.) drew up a draft national mass 
fatality plan related to a possible influenza pandemic, then pushed that plan out to every 
level where operational partners would ultimately make or break its success (Crime 
Reduction and Community Safety Group, Public Order Unit-Mass Fatalities Unit 
[CRCSG], 2007).  A Framework for Planners Preparing to Manage Death is aimed at 
“local planners preparing contingency plans for the extraordinary circumstances (Home 
Office, 2008, p. 7).”  The Home Office asked for a review from planners, professionals in 
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the field, and faith communities on practicality, gaps, the appropriateness of guidance, 
and comments in general.  The Home Office was quite blunt in what it was looking for 
from the local level review:  “We are not seeking your views on the likelihood of these 
events occurring, the necessity for such planning, nor the planning assumptions 
themselves, all of which are beyond the scope of this Framework (CRCSG, 2007, p. 1).”  
It asked for stakeholder input on the practicality of the guidance, whether there were gaps 
in the recommendations, and what the concerns were regarding working on MFM issues 
in surge.   
The U.K. planning assumptions for MFM include three projected scenarios:  best, 
moderate, and worst case fatality rates based on attack rate modeling from past 
pandemics.  The local authorities and service providers were asked to assess their risks 
and take “trigger points” into account for planning purposes (CRCSG, 2007, p. 9).  
Trigger points are defined in the plan as tipping points (e.g., absenteeism or limited 
storage space) that would necessitate an alternate way of working in the subsequent surge 
of death.  The plan addresses different ways of working with three defined transition 
phases to manage the mass fatality incident.  Phase One measures are those which 
individual business areas identify and implement unilaterally through single-agency 
business continuity plans.  Phase Two measures rely on the cooperation between the 
organizations involved in MFM.  Phase Three operations would require legislative 
legislation to provide adequate surge capability for MFM (Home Office, 2008, p. 9).    
The Home Office lays out all of the current guidance documents and local roles 
per existing legal code (e.g., authorities, service providers, central government.)  
Emphasis in the plan is given to the fact that a mass fatality incident will not allow 
business as usual and that the public, although needing reassurance, must become a part 
of the solution (CRCSG, 2007, p. 29).  The Framework presents over 45 pages of 
practical recommendations to be used on the local level, with admonishments for open 
jurisdictional dialogues and suggestions on the needed membership for such a dialogue.  
The U.K. plan underscores the fact that there will be no resources in MFM that the locals 
do not preplan or secure prior to or during the response.  
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U.K.’s Framework clearly lays out command and control, with the need for public 
engagement regarding every recommendation as the guidance lays out the expectations of 
the Central Government, regional resiliency entities, and local service providers (Home 
Office, 2008, pp. 17-19).  The legal framework surrounding mass fatality management in 
the U.K. is clarified early through a Key Legislation section (Home Office, 2008, p. 8).  
The death industry in the U.K. is very similar to that of the U.S. in that there are 
physicians, coroners, and registrars involved in the medico-legal activities.  Like the U.S., 
U.K. attending physicians are the primary point for death certification.  Also like the 
U.S., the coroner and his/her office is still the appropriate authority if foul play or unusual 
circumstances are suspected in the death.  Once PI exists in country, the U.K. will not 
consider the PI deaths of individuals meeting an epidemiologically-defined case 
definition as coroner’s cases.  Since the coroner is found at only the jurisdictional level in 
both the U.K. and U.S., this conservation of coroner expertise preserves a valuable expert 
resource.  This is not to say that coroners will not be involved in the U.K. PI response and 
recovery, but simply that mortality due to PI does not necessitate a death investigation by 
the coroner into the circumstances. 
Although the U.K. has not yet had an opportunity to prove its planning approach 
in a pandemic, the U.K. has the most advanced MFM plan publicly available.  It has 
incorporated true stakeholder and citizen inclusion, partnership recommendations, clear 
indications that locals are responsible for grass-roots-up operational details, with 
responsibility at the national level for needed legislative attention to provide a consistent, 
liability-controlled operational environment — all elements of proven success in generic 
disaster planning that puts its plan front and center.  In addition, the U.K. tested elements 
of the plan during its February 2008 Exercise Winter Willow with subsequent lessons 
identified in a published after action plan (Health Protection Agency, 2008).  Those 




The Framework puts U.K.’s Home Office on record as offering their expertise 
and advice without false reassurance of pending assistance and national resources.  In the 
closing section of the U.K.’s Framework, a recommendation for public communication is 
made to government officials and stakeholders:  “tell it all, tell it truthfully and tell it 
quickly (CRCSG, 2007, p. 29).”   
3. Canada:  Waterloo Region 
Canada’s Waterloo Public Health Region provides another look at international 
planning for MFM.  The region’s plan goes to the core of pandemic influenza mass 
fatality planning by stating up front that “this type of mass fatality response will be unlike 
any other (Region of Waterloo, Public Health, 2007, p. 4),” even an incident like the 
Asian tsunami.  The planners note the extended time period of the PI waves of infection 
and the intense psychosocial effect of a global incident.  Waterloo’s plan includes 
resource recommendations to sustain response across the multiple outbreaks and 
guidance to name key leaders and local agencies well in advance, establishing dialogue 
before the PI occurrence.  The Canadian plan also provides checklists to help those 
pronouncing death know when to exclude the death from a coroner’s investigation and to 
make a presumptive diagnosis involving influenza as the cause of death.  It is 
acknowledged that mass fatality, although not a popular topic in any situation, must be 
broached with an upfront discussion about impending decisions.  While not laid out with 
the depth and breadth of the U.K. Framework, the document provides actionable 
guidance at a regional level to mortuary stakeholders.   
4. Indian Ocean Tsunami and Myanmar Cyclone  
An investigative team going into Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka after the 
South Asian tsunami disaster systematically documented how the dead were managed in 
terms of body recovery and storage, identification, disposal of human remains, and health 
risks from the dead bodies (Morgan, Sribanditmongkol, et al., 2006).  The team found 
that the technological and logistical challenge of recovering and identifying the victims 
was extremely difficult due to a lack of refrigeration for preservation, temporary burial, 
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sufficient forensic capability on a global level, and a lack of national or local mass 
fatality plans.  The respectful treatment of dead bodies and comfort of the remaining 
living was hampered by the absence of practical field guidelines and an international 
agency that could provide technical support.  The authors indicate that there were no 
technical guidelines to manage mass fatalities following large natural disasters at the time 
of the Tsunami response (Morgan, Sribanditmongkol, et al., p. 0809). 
The Myanmar cyclone aftermath unfolded during this writing.  There is no 
evidence that the international response capabilities for MFM has come of age during the 
four years passing since the Asian tsunami.  Given the ruling junta’s reluctance to allow 
aid into their country, which also occurred in Myanmar during the tsunami, there are no 
immediate opportunities to observe response improvements.  Mortality estimates for the 
cyclone, with geographical dispersion to include Yangon, a major population center and 
the Irrawaddy delta, is estimated at 60,000 - 100,000.   
According to the calculations, the Ayeyarwady region was hardest hit, 
with 1.8 million people affected; another 1.1 million were potentially 
affected in the Yangon administrative division. At least 100,000 people in 
both the Bago East and Mon divisions were also affected. The United 
Nations estimates that as many as 220,000 are missing following the 
cyclone and that 63,000 to 101,000 people were killed. (Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health News Center, 2008). 
5.  International Planning Summary 
The international literature portrays mass fatality management in PI as a special 
operation — something to be addressed in planning that goes well beyond the norm of 
fatality management.  The distinctiveness of MFM in pandemic is readily apparent, as 
evidenced by the U.K.’s plan urging the public health ministry to “talk truth,” as well as 
Canada’s warning that this type of mass fatality incident is truly unique.  There has been 
no testing of these PI plans at the international level, with the exception of a national 
exercise in the U.K., although the tsunami in Asia and cyclone in Myanmar make it clear 
that MFM into the thousands wreaks havoc with resource requirements, even during a 
one-time, geographically confined incident.   
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C. NATIONAL GUIDANCE AND RESPONSE SUPPORT FOR MASS 
FATALITY MANAGEMENT (MFM) 
1. Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 was issued in December of 
2003.  It established national policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States 
to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual terrorist 
attacks and major disasters, and it included a goal for national preparedness (DHS, 2007a, 
p. 22).  The national preparedness goal resulted in the National Preparedness Guidelines 
which incorporated The National Response Plan (NRP), as national doctrine for 
preparedness to include Emergency Support Function #8:  Public Health and Medical 
(DHS, 2004b).  The 2004 NRP, an all-discipline, all-hazards comprehensive framework 
for managing domestic incidents, was updated to the National Response Framework 
(NRF) in January 2008.  The NRF remains a guide for conducting a nationwide all-
hazards response, “built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to 
align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation, linking all levels of government, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector (DHS, 2008b, p. i).”  
The Public Health and Medical Services Annex, Emergency Support Function 
(ESF) 8 in the NRP-NRF, was developed to provide coordinated federal assistance to 
supplement state, local, and tribal resources in response to public health and medical care 
needs.  ESF 8 paves the way for a coordinated disaster response, and is primarily devoted 
to detailing the coordination of the emergency support for life safety and life saving 
measures.  Functionality for mass fatality events is included in this annex, but is 
subsumed by the heavy health response emphasis on the living.  The NRF (2008a, pp. 8-
7) addresses MFM in a traditional, non-pandemic approach, including a total of twelve 
lines of text to address the HHS support role in tracking and documenting of human 
remains, establishing temporary morgue facilities, determining the cause and manner of 
death, and identifying human remains using scientific means (presumably calling on the 
use of the federal DMORT teams).  Recognized national subject matter experts in MFM, 
including the Mass Fatality Working Group, are concerned that ESF 8 lacks the strategic 
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and operational insight necessary to address mass-fatality events and operations that 
exceed traditional, scene-based MFM scenarios by tens of thousands (Gursky, 2007, p. 3; 
NORTHCOM and HHS, 2006, p. 2).  The U.S. Department of Health and Human Service 
(HHS) is the lead for ESF 8 as well as the coordinating entity (DHS, 2008a, p. 8~3).  
2. Fatality Management Target Capability 
The Target Capabilities List (TCL) is a part of the National Preparedness 
Guidelines capability-based planning process.  The TCL (DHS, 2007b, p. iii) describes 
the capabilities related to the four homeland security mission areas of prevent, protect, 
respond, and recover, and it provides measurement standards for various preparedness 
capabilities.  Fatality Management is the last capability in the Response Mission area and 
is defined as: 
…the capability to effectively perform scene documentation; the complete 
collection and recovery of the dead, victim’s personal effects, and items of 
evidence; decontamination of remains and personal effects; transportation, 
storage, documentation, and recovery of forensic and physical evidence; 
determination of the nature and extent of injury; identification of the 
fatalities using scientific means; certification of the cause and manner of 
death; processing and returning of human remains and personal effects of 
the victims to the legally authorized person(s); and interaction with and 
provision of legal, customary, compassionate, and culturally competent 
required services to the families of deceased within the context of the 
family assistance center. … Fatality management operations are conducted 
through a unified command structure (DHS, 2007b, p. 519). 
The Fatality Management TCL guidance is filled with various teams and resource 
tallies of federal assets available for national deployment to assist local and state 
response, as well as recommendations on what resources jurisdictions need to pre-
position or plan to bring to the incident for fatality management response.  The planning 
assumption for this capability and the subsequent capacity measurements is based on an 
Improvised Nuclear Device scene-based scenario.  The TCL section specifically states 
that this guidance can also be applied across several scenarios, to include a disease 
outbreak (DHS, 2007b, p. 529).   
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The only language specific to a PI incident is encapsulated in four bullet points 
emphasizing that the disease spread would occur simultaneously across the United States, 
affecting most communities virtually at once and making it very unlikely that federal 
assets would be available for local/state support (DHS, 2007b, p. 534).  No other 
guidance is provided specific to this non-scene based, communicable disease scenario, 
nor are there recommendations for special considerations to be undertaken by local, 
regional, or state jurisdictions in terms of resource planning.  The pandemic influenza 
bullets are found under a section entitled “Approaches for Large-Scale Events” and co-
located with such incidents as a terrorist release of anthrax and pneumonic plague, as 
well as nerve agents and a major earthquake.  The placement seems to try and 
differentiate mass fatality management in terms of incident severity.  Indeed, the listed 
resource element units after this section indicate a heavier federal resource load for 
response in these large-scale events.  Curiously, this resource listing occurs after the 
document has already stated that federal assets will not be available for local/state use in 
PI due to the simultaneous nature of disease outbreak across the nation.  
3. Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams 
Most current MFM plans include the use of Disaster Mortuary Response Teams 
(DMORT) and traditional scene-based models.2  A DMORT is a national asset developed 
in the early 1980’s by the National Funeral Directors Association (NFDA) to address a 
need for standardization within their profession for mass fatality incident response 
(National Disaster Medical System [NDMS], n.d.).  The NFDA realized the need for a 
wide array of death industry partners to achieve true capability in coordinating MFM.  
They invited others to collaborate and DMORTs now cover the nation across ten regions, 
organized under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) maintains two Disaster Portable Morgue Units  
 
                                                 
2 The adjective traditional versus legacy is intentionally used here. Legacy, as defined by Webster’s 
New College Dictionary, is “being or having to do with something, esp. something outdated or otherwise 
undesirable, which is carried over from a previous system, business operation, etc.” DMORTs are not 
legacy resources, but must be factored into MFM planning only as their make-up and operational function 
allows.   
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(DPMUs), one on the east coast and one on the west (NDMS, n.d.).  There is also a 
separate national DMORT-WMD team, trained to respond to terrorist incidents involving 
weapons of mass destruction of a biological, chemical, or radiological nature.  
The DMORT was designed for a regionally based mass fatality response 
involving a geographically confined fatality surge.3  A DMORT includes volunteers from 
medical and forensic practice who have formed a response team under the guidance of 
the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).  DMORT personnel can identify victims, 
use forensic pathology and anthropology methods, and provide mortuary services.  Their 
traditional model of MFM fits well, for example, with multiple/large vehicular or airplane 
crashes where these special skills are in demand for traumatized bodies.  The DMORTs 
are a proven valuable national asset with over 1200 highly trained and skilled 
practitioners.  The DMORT response in PI, though, would be limited by its member 
numbers, its mandated use as a federal (not state or local) asset, and its memberships’ 
primary allegiance to first response in their home communities. 
4. Mass Fatality Working Group Recommendations 
The seminal set of mass fatality planning literature for catastrophic surge 
preparedness, response, and recovery in the United States was published in 2006-2007.  It 
was produced in conjunction with the Mass Fatality Working Group, convened by the 
United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in cooperation with the Department of 
Health and Human Service (HHS).  The two-day conference occurred in the spring of 
2006 at the Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) headquarters in Fort Monroe, 
Virginia.  The event took place after increasing concern on the part of its lead planners 
that mass fatality was not being addressed in a coherent, coordinated, or actionable 
                                                 
3 DMORT teams opened a morgue with 5,000 capacity for Katrina’s victims in September 2005 in the 
small Louisiana town of Saint Gabriel. The facility was installed in a large warehouse not far from the state 
capital Baton Rouge, and was reported to be able to process 144 bodies a day with a staff of 100 working in 
shifts to keep it going around the clock.  
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direction at the national, state, or local levels (Gursky, 2007, p. 3).4  The workgroup 
included medical examiners, health care workers, mental health professionals, law 
enforcement, casket manufacturers, funeral directors, and leaders from local, state, and 
federal government.  The Mass Fatality Working Group concluded that much must yet be 
accomplished in the area of mass fatality planning for response and recovery, particularly 
in mass fatality management related to PI.  They published a total of four reports post-
conference:  Morgue Operations, Identification and Command and Control; Funeral 
Services and Final Disposition; Scene Ops to Include Identification and Medico-Legal 
Protocols; and The Provision of Family Assistance and Behavioral Health Services 
(Devlin et al., 2006; NORTHCOM and HHS, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).   
The Joint Task Force Civil Support Working Group on Mass Fatality determined 
that any regional plan for mass fatality management should include the following seven 
areas for viability of response and recovery operations (Gursky, 2007, p. 4): 
• Command and control 
• Body identification 
• Medico-legal investigation 
• Morgue operations 
• Funeral services 
• Final disposition 
• Family assistance and behavioral health services 
This workgroup’s publications are as close to a formal representation of national 
MFM consensus that the U.S. has come.  Their recommendations are the only national 
level guidelines currently available, which specifically address catastrophic death surge 
in any detail (Gursky, 2007, p. 9).  Each of the reports provides direction to develop 
operational direction for planning capabilities.  The reports’ guidance is delivered 
                                                 
4 The team was led by Dr. Elin A. Gursky, Principal Deputy for Biodefense of the National Strategies 
Support Directorate, ANSER (Analytical Services) of the Homeland Security Institute and Senior Fellow at 
the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies. Dr. Gursky has been active in the homeland 
security arena with a public health focus since August 2001 with several hallmark documents to her credit, 
including: Drafted to Fight Terror: U.S. Public Health on the Front Lines of Biological Defense; The 
Threat of Smallpox: Eradicated but Not Erased; Hometown Hospitals—The Weakest Link? Bioterrorism 
Readiness in America’s Rural Hospitals; Progress and Peril: Bioterrorism Preparedness Dollars and 
Public Health; and Anthrax 2001: Observations on the Medical and Public Health Response. 
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through a gap-analysis of MFM activities to be addressed by local and regional planners.  
Those identified gaps are presented below as open questions to determine measures and 
partnerships needed to achieve MFM capability (NORTHCOM and HHS, 2006a, pp. 1, 
3; 2006b, pp. 11-12; 2006c, pp. 2-3):  
a. Questions Related to Authority/Policy and Procedures 
How might fatality management lines of authority and relevant policies 
and procedures be established at the national and state levels in order to provide a 
template or guide for local planning?  What elements within this guidance are critical for 
field expedient identification and disposition of pandemic influenza victims in a nation of 
varied cultures, religious backgrounds, socio-economics and values?  Since 
communication and clear lines of authority during all stages of the pandemic are essential 
to successful MFM planning and operations, how can relevant stakeholders be identified 
and included in the development of pre-event pandemic education plan for emergency 
center operations personnel and the public? 
b. Questions Related to Already Developed Pandemic Influenza 
Planning 
How should currently mandated state pandemic influenza plans be adapted 
and/or modified to ensure realistic mass fatality management at the local level?  Who 
should be involved in coordinating and leading this effort?  Given that it is the current 
capacity of local funeral and mortuary services operations that will ultimately be 
overwhelmed, how will protocol be defined for handling, processing, safe keeping, and 
disposition of large numbers of remains in a respectful and dignified manner?   
c. Questions Related to Private versus Public Responsibilities and 
Roles 
How does a professional body of practice (i.e., the death care industry) 
develop a non-traditional first responder mindset in order to deliver field expedient 
mortuary services in disaster surge?  Why are funeral service personnel, suppliers and 
other mortuary service operations not routinely included in disaster planning for a PI 
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surge that will result in hundreds and thousands of bodies to identify and humanely 
dispose of?  How do the local level responders prepare for this role without a promise of 
state or federal assistance?  The ability to respond effectively to a pandemic event 
depends on the availability of critical resources (e.g., vaccine, fuel, utilities, labor, raw 
materials, transportation, security, communication bandwidth, etc.) as well as the surge 
competencies of the professional group utilizing the resources (e.g., public education 
messages, pre-established partnerships, incident management knowledge). How might 
state PI plans be developed, adapted and/or modified to address resource, logistics, and 
funding concerns down to assurance of local capacity?  
d. Questions Related to Family Assistance Efforts 
How might a virtual Family Assistance Center (FAC) be established in a 
communicable infectious disease environment using the internet, newspapers and 
television to disburse educational information to the public?  How might a national 
database for missing persons be set up to address the concerns related to relatives and 
others who are unaccounted for?  Given the contagious nature of PI and given that the 
gathering and milling about of people at the FAC will be not be feasible during social 
distancing, how will FACs operate?  Since death surge related to PI will be chronic rather 
than static (acute and scene-based), how will waves of deaths over a period of several 
weeks and involving multiple family members at different times, affect needed 
distribution of information?  How can the needed information be pushed rather than 
pulled (i.e., needing to bring people in) to obtain information about potential fatalities?  
Since local jurisdictions will be overwhelmed with response, how will the federal level of 
government coordinate and manage a nationwide need for information regarding missing 
persons in a highly mobile and family-separated society? 
5. National Planning Summary 
The U.S. has made a concerted effort to provide guidance through all manner of 
disaster preparedness frameworks and discourse to assist state and local planning regions 
rise to the challenge of a coordinated and successful response and recovery effort when 
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faced with all-hazard disasters and catastrophe.  Each of the national guidance documents 
has gone through at least one major revision since its entry post-September 11, improving 
its use for the stakeholders involved in each of the emergency support functions and 
target capabilities.  When it comes to the subject of MFM, however, there is not a lot to 
be found in the national planning documents, pre- or post-revisions.  Although briefly 
mentioned, MFM is by and far a shadow topic in national planning.  The hallmark 
national literature on MFM is found courtesy of publications related to a 2006 
NORTHCOM and HHS conference to determine gaps and potential solutions in MFM, 
albeit more questions were proposed than actual operational answers.   
D. STATE GUIDANCE AND LOCAL PLANNING FOR MASS FATALITY 
MANAGEMENT (MFM) 
Current state MFM plans are found in one of two vehicles:  1) as parts of or 
annexes to the state’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) under ESF 8: Public Health and 
Medical Services, or 2) as parts of or annexes to the state’s pandemic influenza (PI) plans 
as a support operation.  For literature review purposes, various state plans were examined 
against the seven recommendations of the Mass Fatality Working Group (Gursky, 2007, 
p. 1).  The state plans, most often written as higher level strategic guidance documents, 
contain some elements for local operational planning, as well.  
1. Nine-State MFM Plan Review 
Nine states were selected as a convenience sample via an internet search process.  
This sample was selected using the Google search engine and categorization of the state 
by its most recent Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) preparedness rating category.  
TFAH released its fifth annual report in 2007, revealing state-by-state health 
preparedness scores based on ten key indicators to assess health emergency preparedness 
capabilities.  Trust for America’s Health website describes the organization as “a non-
profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to saving lives by protecting the health of 
every community and working to make disease prevention a national priority.”  Since the 
rating of states by public health readiness started in 2002, they have received much 
attention to include rated states wanting to increase their scores.  The first three “hits” 
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(states) within each of the three categorical TFAH scores of 6-7, 8, 9-10 were selected for 
examination of MFM planning during a consistently worded web-search:  “mass-fatality-
management-state.”  There were no states scoring less than a six in TFAH’s report.  The 
following states were selected for this literature review of MFM specific content (the 
respective TFAH score in parentheses):  Virginia (10); Illinois (10); North Carolina (9); 
California (8); Minnesota (8); Texas (8); Florida (7); Montana (7); and Iowa (6).   
For each selected state, the state EOP ESF 8 annex and  PI plan were examined 
for MFM language and the MFM planning specifically compared against the Mass 
Fatality Working Group’s seven-area recommendations.  Although the convenience 
sample was chosen within a TFAH score framework, the resulting review of the states’ 
MFM plans, to include local plans in some cases, does not necessarily reveal a positive 
correlation for MFM capability for catastrophic surge (e.g., PI) in light of the respective 
TFAH score.  That is, the TFAH score does not correlate with the state’s MFM 
preparedness capability, at least on paper. 
Virginia’s “Mass Fatality Planning (2008),” incorporates a mixture of eight 
presentations, flowcharts, and pamphlets that represent the state’s MFM planning to 
include PI.  Virginia does not differentiate pandemic mass fatality from traditional MFM 
approaches so much as it compares the anticipated death surge needs to a normal flu 
season, except “much worse.”  The flowcharts clarify how deaths should be handled for 
disposition in and out of hospital, assisting locals to determine which agencies and 
jurisdictions should be involved in death certification.  The state has run the CDC FluAid 
2.0 (2000) statistics for each of its emergency planning regions and has publicly released 
the anticipated numbers of deaths related to PI for each.  A separate brochure, 
“Information for Managing Pandemic Influenza Fatality Events in Virginia (2006),” lays 
out the scenario of catastrophic surge during a PI incident, providing a four column 
folded brochure of considerations.  A paragraph in the brochure emphasizes the 
differences in PI mortality approaches that local responders/government will want to take 
into account, e.g., PI deaths as non-coroner cases, human remains as a non-significant 
threat for handlers using universal precautions, tracking of remains in a mass casualty 
environment, and consideration of storage spaces.  There is no guidance as to how the 
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locals are actually to work through the MFM issues at hand.  In light of the Mass Fatality 
Working Group recommendations, though, the State of Virginia presents some of best-
aligned state planning to date given their categorized brochure and supporting plans.  
Virginia has been working on a comprehensive systems approach to mass casualty 
planning since the late 1990’s to include elements of MFM (Green, 2000).  
The State of Illinois includes a MFM planning in its Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response Plan, Annex 5 (2006).  After determining state mortality 
numbers using CDC’s FluAid 2.0 (2000) calculations, the annex moves into traditional 
MFM realms, citing the availability of state and DMORT assistance.  North Carolina 
parallels this traditional MFM type of approach on two pages in its Pandemic Influenza 
Plan, Appendix K-1 (2006).  Neither Illinois or North Carolina give any detailed MFM 
guidance to their local stakeholders that is aligned with the Mass Fatality Working 
Group’s seven areas of command and control, body identification, medico-legal 
investigation, morgue operations, funeral services, final disposition, or family assistance 
and behavioral health services. 
California has done some exemplary work in local MFM planning through one of 
the CDC funded Advanced Practice Centers (APCs):  Santa Clara County (Lee, LaDue, 
and Linstrom, 2007).  The Santa Clara County APC is the only known public health 
entity nationally that has published MFM planning documents explicitly based on the 
Mass Fatality Working Group’s seven recommendations.  There is enough awareness 
within the state in terms of MFM planning that in May of 2007, Government Technology 
published an article entitled “No Longer Taboo” which detailed California plans to move 
forward and meet the challenge of mass fatality (Gerber, 2007).  That said, the current 
round of California PI-specific planning completed in 2006 is relatively silent on MFM 
specifics, allowing only one paragraph and interspersed statements that essentially state 
that mass fatality planning needs to be taken into consideration by the local partners. 
Texas (Texas Hospital and Public Health Emergency Preparedness Programs, 
2008) is currently developing a MFM plan, having recognized the state’s prior planning 
for disaster responses and recovery did not include this death surge response, to include 
PI planning.  Regional meetings are currently underway to develop regional plans after 
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receiving training specific to mass fatality.  The meetings are incorporating PI-specific 
MFM efforts to include collaborative meetings at the regional level, which involve multi-
disciplinary teams.  A Mass Fatalities Regional Planning and Training event was hosted 
in February 2008 by the Central Texas Regional Advisory Council and facilitated by the 
National Mass Fatalities Institute, Kirkwood Community College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 
Since that time, the region has met for additional policy and planning sessions. (Email 
communication with Danielle Schmitz). Montana’s 2005 Pandemic Influenza Response 
Plan mentions in its section on public health responsibilities that a mass fatality plan 
should be developed and exercised, but only two short bullet points include mass fatality 
language.  
Florida has published its MFM plan (Florida Medical Examiner Commission 
[FMEC], 2006) as a part of its state’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.  
The 24-page document covers an array of MFM topics including  concepts of operations, 
responsibilities of the medical examiner, medico-legal investigation, records 
management, tracking systems, final disposition, and family assistance.  Florida’s MFM 
plan comprehensively covers each aspect of the Mass Fatality Working Group’s 
recommendations for MFM planning areas for traditional trauma-based, geo-centered 
death surge.  The document also includes references, statutory citations, and jurisdictional 
listings (FMEC, 2006, pp. 22-23).  Although the plan would certainly lend a planning 
foundation to MFM in a PI environment, it would still require a companion plan or 
additional guidance given the different approaches needed (e.g., in the medico-legal 
investigation realms and morgue operations area.)  There is no mention of MFM in 
Florida’s PI plan.     
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Iowa’s Pandemic Influenza Response Plan (2006), published by the Iowa 
Department of Health, does not mention mass fatality planning.  Iowa serves as home to 
both of the nation’s self-identified centers for mass fatality planning.5   
2. Ohio MFM Plan Review 
For purposes of this research, Ohio is the state of immediate interest.  The Ohio 
Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) (OEMA, 2006) was developed soon after the Ohio 
Emergency Management Agency was created within the Department of Public Safety in 
1999 under Ohio Revised Code 5502.22.  The plan is revised on a regular basis by state 
mandate.  It contains “Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8:  Public Health and 
Medical Services,” where the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) is listed as the Primary 
Agency, the agency with coordination responsibility for the ESF (OEMA, 2007a).   
In 2007, a small cell of state planners facilitated by the OEMA completed and 
released Tab D to Emergency Support Function #8:  the Acute Mass Fatalities Incident 
Response Plan.  This document provides state-level mass fatalities text that defines the 
organization and assignment of responsibilities for what the working group has termed 
“acute mass fatalities.”  The plan is also unique in that it uses an EOP format to delineate 
clearly who should be responsible for what operational aspects during the response and 
recovery period of a mass fatality incident.   
Like Florida’s MFM guidance, however, Ohio’s EOP MFM annex provides 
guidance for a traditional definition of mass fatalities operations:  a scene-based incident 
creating a one-time surge.  The plan relies on local jurisdictions to mount a successful 
response by factoring in available on-scene support by state and federal partners, 
including DMORT assets.  The Acute Plan does not account for a disease-based, 
geographically diverse scenario incorporating thousands of deaths from a contagious 
                                                 
5 Both the National Mass Fatalities Institute http://www.nmfi.org/ and the International Mass Fatalities 
Center http://www.massfatalities.com/ are housed in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The National Mass Fatalities 
Institute was founded in 2000 with a congressional grant administered through the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. Its mission is to prepare communities for the effective management of mass 
fatalities events. The International Mass Fatalities Center is a 501(c) 3, non-profit organization and 
promotes its mission as providing disaster experienced instructors on-site and via the Internet to ensure the 
appropriate care of the fatalities while caring for the emotional and physical needs of survivors, workers 
and their families in the aftermath of a disaster.  
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disease:  a catastrophic surge in mass fatalities.  The same planning cell has recently been 
at work to devise what will be called the Non-Acute Mass Fatalities Incident Response 
Plan.  The Non-Acute Plan was written as the companion document to the Acute Plan, 
with non-acute deaths defined as those deaths which do not occur suddenly, but through a 
situation developing over an extended time period due to disease, biological, chemical, or 
radiological contamination to include pandemics. It is slated for release in the fall of 2008 
to be used as state guidance for local operations after its full review by various state 
agencies (OEMA, 2008).6 
Ohio’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan (ODH, 2006, pp. 41-
43) devotes two pages to MFM in an 85-page document.   
The MFM portion of the plan states that: 
• The Electronic Death Registration (EDRS) will be streamlined by ODH 
during the pandemic 
• Large numbers of deaths will occur outside health care facilities 
• Local jurisdictions must have the capability to effectively perform all 
aspects of fatality management (ODH, 2006, pp. 34-35 and 67-68) 
The first bullet is the only one that is addressed with guidance within Ohio’s PI plan.  
Ohio’s EDRS timeline of activities include training, research, and statutory changes to 
better manage death registration during the surge.  Nothing is mentioned regarding body 
collection, storage, disposition, or Family Care Centers.    
3. State and Local Planning Summary 
Current state MFM plans are currently found as a part of or in an annex to the 
state’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) under ESF 8 or as a part of or an annex to the 
state’s pandemic influenza (PI).  Most examples of a PI MFM inclusion were written in 
2005, during the federal mandate for state pandemic influenza plans.  Very few states 
have stand alone MFM plans.  For those that do, the states are not necessarily equipped to 
                                                 
6 By virtue of this study, the author had the opportunity to join the mass fatality planning cell partway 
through the writing of the Non-Acute Mass Fatalities Incident Response Plan. Areas from the Mass Fatality 
Working Group have been incorporated into the final draft of this plan, released for review to the agencies 
in spring 2008. 
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have local planners achieve MFM capability in pandemic surge.  Often, this lack of 
capability can be traced to the use of traditional MFM response to achieve a non-scene 
based approach.  Neither does current state MFM planning recommend a need for 
regional response and recovery to conserve resources that will surely be in parallel 
demand status.  Ohio’s current MFM planning, like the bulk of state plans previously 
reviewed, does not demonstrate the capability to sustain death surge in a pandemic event 
that demands a concurrent statewide MFM response.   
E.   REGIONAL RESPONSE FOR SURGE SYNERGY 
1. Regional Planning Needs in Surge 
The traditional verticality of the local-state-federal levels of disaster paradigm is 
firmly etched in the nation’s pre-2005 planning documents, as well as its resulting 
emergency planning and response infrastructure (DHS, 2008b, pp. 1-11).  This vertically 
aligned and perpendicularly phased-in process to prevent, protect, respond, and recover in 
disaster goes something like this:   
• Disasters occur even with the best in preventive efforts and presumably in 
a geographically concentrated area 
• Local response mechanisms (i.e., emergency services) are launched 
according to pre-planning on paper and advanced coordination 
arrangements between officials, responders, and agencies. 
• State support for the local disaster response is “at the ready,” along with 
federal resources, if called on; pre-planning for these higher level support 
operations are also on paper and coordinated in advance 
The concept of catastrophic disaster (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) and disasters 
without boundaries (e.g., pandemics) demands capacity beyond traditional verticality.  
While the brunt of operational response mechanisms do occur at the local level in 
emergency and disaster, in higher level disaster (i.e., catastrophe), local jurisdictions must 
be prepared to move immediately into multi-echelon and horizontally collaborative 
action.  This type of operation does not cleanly follow a perpendicularly leveled 
emergency management system.  Public health surge capacity refers to the ability to 
implement core public health activities in disaster such as mass prophylaxis and 
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vaccination, risk communication, epidemiologic investigation, and, of course, mass 
fatality management (MFM) (Koh et al., 2006, p. 211).  Community capability in public 
health surge in catastrophic incidents demands a regional response as the minimum level 
of initial coordination (Inglesby, 2006).  “Comprehensive regional preparedness is key to 
ensuring that communities, states, and the nation can expeditiously respond to and 
recover from disasters of all types, particularly extreme events (TISP, 2006, p. 3).” 
A disaster planning region is considered as an area that is defined as such by 
stakeholders in order to address an issue and may include municipalities, counties, a 
portion of a state, across-state clusters, and/or across-nation borders.  Regions generally 
have certain accepted cultural characteristics and contiguous geographic boundaries, and 
tend to coincide with the service areas of the infrastructures that serve them (TISP, 2006, 
p. 2).  There is not enough capability within any response locale, usually defined as a 
county by most states, to sustain a response to catastrophic surge when there is parallel 
demand for resources.  In addition, the traditional “we’ll be there in 72 hours” backup 
response from the federal level is not timely enough to prevent the initial surge from 
progressing into the chaos of a catastrophe in terms of resource needs.   
The following figures provide graphic representations of public health/medical 
surge scenarios of surge realities in catastrophe.  Figure 1 presents a traditional event that 
is geospatial in nature.  In other words, consequence results, to include MFM, are limited 
by some kind of incident boundary and subsequent resource and needs surge is bounded 
itself by local surge capabilities meeting up with state and federal capabilities within a 






























Figure 1.   Public Health/Medical Surge in a Geospatially Confined Incident (After: 
Barbisch, 2006, the SBCCOM Bio Warfare Improved Response Program)  
Now bring in a worst-case scenario in terms of catastrophic surge:  a scenario 
involving a non-geographically centered incident like pandemic influenza.  Such a 
disaster would produce a demand for parallel response to needs that immediately negates 
capabilities in the traditional perpendicular response method.  This means that the Federal 
Medical Support shown in Figure 1 does not arrive, an insufficient amount of support 
arrives, and/or any support that arrives comes at a much later date as shown in Figure 2. 
The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (NSPI) purposefully designed a 
decentralized plan emphasizing the possibility of state, regional, and local solo 
capabilities for preparedness, planning, and response during a PI incident (The White 
House, 2005).  Secretary of Health and Human Services, Michael O. Leavitt warns:  “A 
pandemic is not like a hurricane or an earthquake, where resources and help can be 
shifted from one area to another. Should it occur, every community will need to rely on  
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its own planning and its own resources as it fights the outbreak (HHS, 2008, p. 3).”  
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Figure 2.   Public Health/Medical Surge in a Geospatially Dispersed Incident (After: 
Barbisch, 2006, the SBCCOM Bio Warfare Improved Response Program)  
The National Preparedness Guidelines (DHS, 2007a, p. 12) emphasize the vital 
nature of regional identification and coordination in order to enhance synchronization 
efforts by federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial entities with one another, the private 
sector, nongovernmental organizations, and individual citizens.  The Guidelines advocate 
formal arrangements among geographic regions to provide the following benefits:  better 
coordination of preparedness activities; economies of scale in terms of spreading cost, 
pooling resources, and disbursing risk; and increasing the overall return on preparedness 
investment.  To date, there is not a widely accepted vehicle for regional planning and 
integration of jurisdictional planning.  Yet, it is precisely at the regional level of response 
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that local jurisdictions gain a capability to move horizontally across public and private 
organizations and can most adeptly provide sustainability beyond those first 36 local 
medical response hours to fill the impending public health and medical surge when the 
state and federal government cannot be everywhere at once (Inglesby, 2006).   
Regional organization is gaining hold as the jurisdictional response of choice for 
certain types of disaster.  For example, the Emergency Management Accreditation 
Program (EMAP) is a nationally recognized emergency management standard and 
accreditation program which has laid groundwork for assessing a region’s emergency 
management capabilities. The existing 58 EMAP standards are reported to be:  “scalable 
and apply to emergency management programs of any size; regions of varying sizes and 
composition are no exception (EMAP, 2006, pp. 3-4).”   
Project Public Health Ready (PPHR), a project of the National Association of 
City and County Health Departments (NACCHO) and the CDC, recently published a 
planning guide to address regional planning development (NACCHO, 2007).  The 
document’s stated purpose is (NACCHO, 2007, p. 6): 
• The development of a common vision in order to reduce the daunting 
initial complexity 
• The development of a planning process using PPHR as a planning 
framework 
• The provision of practical tips, tools, and resources from PPHR regional 
sites 
• A description of possible outcomes and obstacles that can be expected in 
developing regional readiness 
The document goes on to lay out a three-phase, 11-step plan for the creation of a regional 
approach to disaster that provides the stability to achieve capability in terms of prevent, 
protect, respond and recover.  It also provides descriptions and examples of different 
collaboration models to include networking, coordinating, standardizing, and centralizing 
(NACCHO, 2007, p. 12). 
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2. Current Ohio Regional Disaster Planning  
There are 30 regional coordinators for public health and medical response in 
Ohio.  These individuals serve across eight homeland security (HLS) regions to 
coordinate the:  1) public health system; 2) Metropolitan Medical Response System; 3) 
Regional Medical Response System (RMRS); and 4) hospitals.  The regional 
coordinators are funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
Cooperative Agreement with the Ohio Department of Health.  The positions were aligned 
with the HLS regions in 2002 when the initial cooperative agreement was released.  The 
regional coordinators work out of a local health department within their respective HLS 
region.  The formal oversight via the state health department for regional coordination 
comes through quarterly meetings and written reporting in conjunction with cooperative 
agreement requirements.   
There are no state standards for regional planning and coordination processes or 
products.  This regional planning level of coordination does not have any formal 
authority, as the coordinators actually work for a loosely knit committee of agency 
leaders (public health and hospital) that likewise have no authority outside of their 
county/city agency and hospital system boundaries.  The regional coordinators constantly 
work to align up to thirty different county/city plans across three different entities (health 
departments, hospitals, and regional-metro medical systems) while striving to align their 
annex templates ultimately with their respective emergency management all-hazards 
plans.  Next, they try to facilitate the development and staging of regional exercises.  
These large, functional exercises have a history of splintering into jurisdiction (only) 
response in the chaos of exercise play.  Each county jurisdiction’s planning product is 
sacred, with 88 different plans replicated across Ohio in an accepted template to include 
the medical/public health annex.  This can certainly be compared to one intelligence 
expert’s take on classified intelligence:  “that processing within the stovepipes has been 
focused on the delivery of documents rather than making sense of all of the information 
in the aggregate (Steele, 2007, p. 142).”   
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A recent Association of Ohio Health Commissioners (AOHC) news item does call 
for an investigative approach to regional roles in disaster planning: 
And what role for the Regions?  Despite considerable variations in size 
and dynamical differences between Regions, they may be an efficient 
vehicle to assume a greater role for meeting target capabilities.  With no 
legal authority, can the Regions play more of a direct role in funding 
allocations and strategic organization of preparedness activities within the 
Regions?  Currently there is a joint AOHC/ODH Regional Planning Task 
Group reviewing planning and service delivery options…(G. Nixon, 
January 11, 2008)   
Ohio does not currently have regional planning incentives nor mandates for public 
health service delivery built into normal, day-to-day operations.  NACCHO has also 
published a study whereby the organization recommends regionalization of public health 
services apart from disasters as an answer to some of the current public health funding 
issues and as a solution to more manageable accreditation compliance for the public 
health infrastructure and its service provision (Bernett, 2007, p. 2).   
3. Regional Jurisdiction Summary 
While custom may dictate that all disaster response is local, a catastrophic 
incident like pandemic influenza creates the potential for overwhelming mass casualty 
and fatality, along with an overwhelming need for a sustained operational surge that 
could last for months.  Indeed, there has been a clarion call for response capacity built on 
regional capabilities and across local boundaries since Hurricane Katrina, considered a 
catastrophic natural disaster and occurring across wide enough swaths that local surge 
response was ineffective almost immediately.  Regional planning remains mostly an 
uninvited and untried concept, however, in the current vertical emergency management 
system of the United States.  Obstacles associated with regional efforts usually are related 
to current jurisdictional realities (e.g., home rule), as well as turf disagreements at the 
local and state levels. 
During the past two years, operational guidance from well-recognized 
organizations in emergency management and public health has called for regional 
planning operations in disaster.  The regionalization efforts in preparedness coincide with 
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parallel efforts in regionalization of general public health service provision.  Mass fatality 
management related to a pandemic influenza incident lends itself to regional planning in 
terms of resources, staff, and system integration and economy of scale.    
F.   COMMUNITY CONFIDENCE AND TRUST:  BUILDING RESILIENCY 
One of the most demoralizing things was the inability to move bodies out 
of the home. 
- John M. Barry, The Great Influenza 
1. The Community Trust and Resiliency Linkage 
Current pandemic influenza planning relies heavily on pharmaceutical solutions, 
namely the distribution of antivirals and vaccines to pre-identified population sectors.  
This approach remains entrenched even after the CDC 2007 release of community 
strategies for nonpharmaceutical PI control.  Members of the scientific and public health 
community (Center for Biosecurity, 2008), however, are raising questions around these 
medical solutions in terms of strategic appropriateness (e.g., the effectiveness of antiviral 
prophylactic use versus antiviral use in early treatment of disease), as well as availability 
realities (e.g., it is unlikely that the appropriate vaccine will be available for at least six 
months and even then, only in limited quantities).  A recent thesis published through the 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security recommends a community policing strategy 
alternative to bolster population action for life safety and voluntary compliance 
nonpharmaceutical intervention.  Alben’s (2007, p. 68) premise is that by preparing the 
communities for the worst (i.e., availability of only nonpharmaceutical interventions such 
as social distancing, proper hygiene, and adjusting the personal living environment for 
self-sustainment during certain time segments in PI), governmental and health leaders 
will realistically assist the community to prepare and participate actively in saving lives.  
The community policing conceptual model is promoted to build trust between the 
population and governmental authorities during a pandemic crisis that occurs without the 
traditional magic bullet:  oral medicines medicine or vaccines.  A disease capable of 
mortality without an immediate cure or prevention, however, obviously produces death.  
How might dead bodies gathering in the community at homes and in morgues impact the 
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community’s trust in its government and leaders?  This question is especially cogent 
pertaining to a public that has been consistently assured that DMORT is just around the 
planning corner, and that funeral services will, of course, be delivered with the utmost in 
cultural diversity. 
In the fall of 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 (HSPD-21) 
established a National Strategy for Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy to 
guide the transformation of the nation’s approach to protecting the health of the 
American people against all disasters.  HSPD-21 defines a catastrophic health event as 
“any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism that results in a number of ill or 
injured persons sufficient to overwhelm the capabilities of immediate local and regional 
emergency response and health care systems (The White House, 2007a, p. 1).”  The 
directive represents a formal governmental push for community resiliency.  Retired U.S. 
Coast Guard Commander, Stephen E. Flynn, argues that although resiliency was once a 
well-known hallmark in U.S. communities, a current climate of fear and sense of 
powerlessness is eating away at national resiliency (2008, p. 2).  He insists that America 
must be re-armed with the confidence and subsequent capability to face disaster that 
arrives in any form, natural or manmade.  He believes that national resiliency will be 
achieved through individuals and communities by (2008, pp. 6-7): 
• a robustness to stand and operate in the face of disaster 
• a resourcefulness to manage once the disaster unfolds 
• an ability to quickly get back to normal post-disaster 
• a pragmatic ability to absorb and act on lessons learned 
The population must trust its community leaders and engage in the policy and 
planning process to build resiliency in the face of disaster.  In turn, community leaders 
must trust the stakeholders and their organizational ability to take calculated risks in 
order to create strength, flexibility, creativity, and collaboration.  Trust building is an 
iterative process, a process that progresses with the usual friction of a meaningful 
relationship.  Reina and Reina (2007, p. 36) of The Reina Trust Building Institute, Inc., 
argue that the building and breaking of trust is a normal cycle in all relationships.  They  
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propose a transactional model for trust involving contractual agreement, communication, 
and competence.  Their template for community trust building includes a return map for 
violations of trust occurring in the past.   
In defining successful leadership during a bioterrorism attack, The Working 
Group on Government Dilemmas in Bioterrorism Response advocates the defense of civil 
liberties, preservation of economic stability, avoidance of scapegoating, and bolstering 
community resiliency, in addition to limiting death and suffering (The Working Group on 
Governance Dilemmas in Bioterrorism Response, 2004, p. 26).  Trust between leaders 
and their communities is at the crux of this effective relationship.   
The civic infrastructure’s capacities to help remedy an extreme event 
include the social circuitry to energize trust between authorities and 
publics, multiple communication channels to reach diverse populations, 
practical support for professional responders, self-organized solutions in 
seeming chaos, and a grounded commitment to recovery (Schoch-Spana et 
al., 2007, p. 1) 
The literature reveals, also, that involving the public is not just about what the 
community receives, but is just as much about what the public can give.  In MFM, death 
surge will quickly outpace the ability of professional practitioners to address the push, 
especially when their primary efforts will be taken up with the needs of the living.  A 
resilient and trusting public, a community that has been previously engaged, will become 
an invaluable asset in response and recovery.  Community level methods to cope with 
mass fatality can “benefit immensely from the community residents’ counsel and 
assistance in relation to the practical, cultural, religious, and psychological dimensions of 
death (Schoch-Spana et al., 2007, p. 21).” 
Schoch-Spana argues that the civic infrastructure must be involved in emergency 
planning and poised to act before, during, and after an event.  She states that the 
community members who interact regularly can “help officials decide in advance who 
gets scarce medical resources, give aid when the professionals cannot be there, comfort 
survivors over time, and set priorities for recovery and restoration (2008, p. 3).”  
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2. Public Engagement  
One of the problems with pandemic influenza planning to date, though, is that 
public health has not incorporated the true public engagement as a core intervention for 
disaster planning or planning for population health in general (Schoch-Spana et al., 2007, 
p. 9).  Mass fatality management across the nation is a pending policy choice with 
multiple decisions yet to be made related to pandemic influenza planning.  MFM 
decisions require technical knowledge and information, as well as an ability to weigh 
competing societal values.  For this reason, it is vital that the public become a part of 
these policy decisions to energize trust between authorities and the public.   
Public participation in emergency planning provides ready access to 
“citizens’ wisdom”—lessons distilled from the life experiences of many 
and diverse people—on how best to tackle serious, unforeseen events. 
Community partners can query plans: Do they reflect community 
sensibilities and priorities? Are they going to work logistically? Do they 
meet the needs of all people or leave certain groups out? How can we 
remedy that? (Schoch-Spana et al., 2007, 17) 
The Public Engagement Project on Community Control Measures for Pandemic 
Influenza was implemented and evaluated in the fall of 2006, sponsored by the 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) and facilitated by The 
Keystone Center (The Keystone Center, 2007).  The project sponsored public 
deliberations involving national stakeholders and citizens at-large on the topic of non-
pharmaceutical measures and PI response.  Community members participated in 
education regarding basic facts around PI and subsequent implications for planning prior 
to starting into the facilitated discussion.  The public was then engaged in dialogue and 
policy thought as to what nonpharmaceutical measures should be implemented early on 
to slow disease spread, yet maintain a viable local economy and community cohesion.  
Goals for the project included:  attracting a diverse group of citizens and stakeholders, 
understanding participant motivation to attend such a forum and to engage, provision of 




of a balanced process representing a diversity of views, and assurance that participant 
effort would be incorporated in subsequent decision making surrounding PI policy and 
guidance (The Keystone Center, 2007, p. 6).   
The Public Engagement Project on Community Control Measures for Pandemic 
Influenza served as a trust-building exercise for the citizens who participated.  The 
report’s summary indicates that increased use of such participatory and transparent group 
process mechanisms are needed to assure reality based planning to slow the spread of PI 
(The Keystone Center, 2007, p. 20).  It only makes sense, then, that such a vehicle could 
also lend sound methodology to another real aspect of PI:  death surge. 
3. Trust and Resiliency Summary  
Mutual trust between citizens-government, stakeholders-leaders, and 
communities-authorities is an important link in tapping into community resiliency across 
the nation.  Engaging the population in public health policy and guidance regarding 
nonpharmaceutical interventions in PI is a pressing issue, increasingly captured in the 
literature surrounding PI solutions in planning.  Although a public engagement model has 
been developed, implemented, and evaluated for such forums, it is still not being 
regularly used to enable communities to make the hard decisions and to take the 
necessary actions required for preparedness, response, and recovery in pandemic surge.  
Mass fatality management is another area of consideration under PI planning that would 
benefit from the use of public engagement strategies.  The building of trust for 
communities among governmental leaders, stakeholders, and citizens-at-large has the 
ability to strengthen population resiliency. 
G.   LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
The specter of PI compels local communities and their death care infrastructure to 
figure out a realistic plan for the body disposition, family assistance, and mass fatality 
capability.  This type of non-scene based mass fatality planning has not been addressed 
with actionable plans for the most part.  Communities and their disaster planning teams  
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are, understandably, pre-disposed to deal with saving lives versus dealing with death.  
Even when attention is turned to MFM, mass fatality in calculated in terms of the 
traditional hundreds with the availability of external partnering and resources.   
When addressing pandemic influenza and mass fatality management, the available 
published literature is cursory at best.  Although a call for MFM planning appears as 
valued and absolutely appropriate at the national and state levels, a lack of appropriate 
strategic and operational guidance with actionable recommendations begs the question of 
how subsequent planning is to be addressed at the regional and local levels.  It is at the 
regional level, in horizontally aligned interactions, that capability building must take 
place for MFM.  There are no national planning standards for MFM operations apart 
from conference recommendations published in a series of white papers in 2006.  In spite 
of this lack of standards, the federal government is mandating that states submit MFM 
plans as a part of their pandemic planning efforts.  In turn, states are demanding the same 
of their local jurisdictions. 
The fact remains that one of the difficulties surrounding MFM is a broader society 
and a health care system that do not necessarily want to talk about or operationally plan 
for death in pandemic and catastrophic surge.  The National Response Framework and 
Guidelines are all about saving lives.  This strong concern for life safety and treating the 
living seems to suppress the need to address the operational and tactical realities of 
dealing with dead bodies and the significant others affected by this loss.  There is a 
resulting deficit to keep culturally diverse populations prepared, informed, and willfully 
ready to address population-based decisions related to MFM in disaster response.  The 
same disaster planning groups that meet monthly to discuss medical surge are not as 
enthusiastic about regular meetings to discuss death surge resulting from pandemic 
influenza.   
Community resiliency is a current thrust within national planning and current 
directives surrounding that planning.  The government and the entire disaster response 
infrastructure cannot dare to think that they can achieve response success for a population 
of almost 300 million.  There is no cavalry waiting in a mystical fort during an all-
encompassing pandemic.  The threat of PI and its ability to produce concurrent infection 
 52
and sustained waves of disease negates the capability of a traditional vertical response.  
Community resiliency, however, will not occur without trust among community leaders, 
stakeholders, and citizens-at-large.  One recent mechanism that is being promoted for 
hard public health decisions is public engagement.  This public engagement, involving all 
players involved in the issue, is about building policy that is acceptable and integrating 
community wide awareness into operational planning for disaster response and recovery.  
In the end, death estimates calculated through CDC FluAid software represent 
death chaos — chaos that the public health system is listed for by name as the primary 
agency lead.  The loss of capability for mass fatality will equate with a public lack of 
confidence in governmental leadership and, perhaps, ultimately crush general public 
health efforts in all response areas if not sustained and controlled.   
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III. METHODOLOGY 
As shown in the literature review, mass fatality management (MFM) planning for 
pandemic surge must take place at the regional level of jurisdictional effort to attain true 
MFM capability in a catastrophic incident.  There is no strategic guidance or operational 
model for regional MFM planning in Ohio.  The key stakeholders in MFM planning are 
without a forum to coordinate MFM preparedness and may be unaware of this deficit and 
its potential consequences.  The following research questions guided the initial 
investigation into regional MFM during pandemic surge: 
• What are the current gaps in Ohio’s guidance for fatality management?   
• What are the current gaps in fatality management operational capability at 
the local and regional levels? 
• What is the current status of fatality management surge resources (e.g., 
staff, stuff [equipment and supplies], systems) at the local and regional 
level?  
• What are the legal, financial, and/or organizational barriers, if any, to 
Ohio’s mass fatality management?  
Based on these questions as well as the MFM preparedness shortfalls identified in 
the MFM literature review, a survey was developed to determine key stakeholder (health 
commissioner, county emergency management director, and county coroner) perceptions 
of agency/jurisdictional progress towards MFM planning within the State of Ohio. 
The survey was designed to explore the awareness, identification, and knowledge 
of existing MFM guidance as well as participant identification of partners, confidence in 
existing planning efforts, and delineation of barriers to MFM operational capability at the 
local, regional, and state levels.  Most importantly, the information derived from the 
survey analysis will assist Ohio’s planners to determine a baseline for actionable regional 
planning for MFM.   
The three target audiences were asked to complete separate but aligned surveys:  
Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge:  City and County Health 
Commissioners; Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge:  County 
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Emergency Managers; and Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge:  
County Coroners.  Copies of each of the three surveys and a combined survey version of 
each question by target audience and category are found in Appendix A.   
A.   SURVEY  DESIGN AND DELIVERY 
The Joint Task Force Civil Support Working Group on Mass Fatality determined 
that any planning effort for MFM should include the following seven areas for viability 
of response and recovery operations (Gursky, 2007, p. 4): 
• Command and control 
• Body identification 
• Medico-legal investigation 
• Morgue operations 
• Funeral services 
• Final disposition 
• Family assistance and behavioral health services. 
The literature review revealed no previously published surveys for MFM in 
catastrophic surge at the local, regional, state, or national level.  Hence, the author 
developed the Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge Survey.  The 
survey’s content was aligned with the seven areas above by clustering questions around 
each area, and the survey also incorporated content related to the four research questions 
presented earlier in this chapter. 
The survey included 38 questions for Health Commissioners, 37 questions for 
County Emergency Management Directors, and 34 questions for County Coroners.  
Participants rated their confidence in their agency’s or jurisdiction’s ability to perform 
MFM operations in preparedness, response, and recovery (1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = 
disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly agree).  They also 
identified MFM lead agents for coordination and operational command and control at 
local and state levels.  After asking the respondents about resource availability, the 
survey invited participants to list bridges and barriers to MFM planning at their 
jurisdictional level.  Next, the respondents described their familiarity with and access to 
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current Ohio MFM planning.  A space for comments and five (5) demographic questions 
completed the survey to include the participant’s identification with one of Ohio’s eight 
homeland security regions.    
Throughout the survey’s development, the author worked to establish survey 
objectives with the statewide core planning group that was responsible for developing 
Ohio’s Tab D to Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8:  the Acute Mass Fatalities 
Incident Response Plan (OEMA, 2007c).  At the time of the survey development, the 
core planning group was developing the Non-Acute Mass Fatalities Incident Response 
Plan, to be released in the fall of 2008 (OEMA, 2008).7  Ohio’s core planning group for 
both the Acute and Non-Acute Plans included representatives from Ohio Emergency 
Management Association and Ohio Department of Health.  The review of written drafts 
was completed through select providers and planners in local hospitals, health 
departments, emergency management agencies, mental health agencies, and the funeral 
directors association.  The core planning group was instrumental in identifying the three 
target audience groups in Ohio for survey purposes, taking the Ohio Revised Code, 
national planning documents, and the state’s ESF 8 into account.   
The Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge Survey was 
reviewed by Ohio’s MFM core planning group and then released to each target audience 
through its respective professional organization.  The author personally approached all 
organizational directors and enlisted their help, and these individuals, in turn, reached out 
to their membership.8  Select members and volunteers from each professional 
organization (Association of Ohio Health Commissioners, Emergency Management 
Association of Ohio, and the Ohio State Coroners Association) were asked to review and 
pilot the survey tool prior to its general release.  Each pilot participant not only completed 
the survey, but also provided written or verbal comments to tighten the language, clarify 
                                                 
7 By virtue of this study, the author had the opportunity to join the mass fatality planning cell part way 
through the writing of the Non-Acute Mass Fatalities Incident Response Plan.  Areas from the 
NORTHCOM~DHHS led Mass Fatality Working Group were incorporated into the final draft, released for 
state agency and select health provider review in April 2008. 
8 Beth E. Bickford, Executive Director, Association of Ohio Health Commissioners; Thomas Kelley, 
Director, Emergency Management Association of Ohio; and David P. Corey, Executive Director, Ohio 
State Coroners Association.  
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question intent, and gauge the ease of participant understanding.  Finally, the survey was 
distributed throughout the Office of Workforce Development in the College of Public 
Health at the Ohio State University for a final pilot with a non-targeted population of 
public health workforce staff to determine question clarity and to garner final edits.  The 
survey went through three revisions prior to its general release to the target audiences.    
The internet survey was fielded through SurveyMonkey using its List Management 
Tool (The SurveyMonkey Team, 2008).  In a closed population of working individuals, 
an internet survey presents a relatively low cost process that can be conducted in a 
shortened timeframe if there is a complete list of email addresses and the survey is 
perceived as work-related (Schonlau, Fricker, and Elliott, 2002, p. 75).  Both of these 
factors applied to the target audiences.  Publicly available email addresses for each of the 
participants was obtained through their respective state agency (Ohio Department of 
Health and Ohio Emergency Management Agency) and/or their professional organization 
(Ohio State Coroners Association).  Marketing for survey awareness and invitations for 
participation was accomplished through organizational and disaster preparedness 
newsletters, postings on various web sites, targeted presentations at various meetings, and 
word of mouth.  An email link took participants directly to the survey website.  Their 
responses were completely confidential and could not be tracked as the respondent IP 
addresses and email addresses were blocked in SurveyMonkey to ensure anonymity. 
An initial email announcing the survey was sent to all recipients one week prior to 
fielding the survey.  This announcement enabled a final opportunity for participant 
awareness and also served as a test run for each of the participant’s email addresses via 
bounce back messages.  Final corrections to the email bounce backs were made via phone 
contact with the respective agency or organization of the potential participant.  Once the 
survey was sent to the participants, three reminder emails followed at seven days, at 14 
days, and two days before the survey tool’s website closed on day 19.  Examples of the 
announcement and reminder emails are found in Appendix A. 
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The data were entered into a SPSS-PC database for descriptive and inferential 
statistical analysis within, between, and among the target audience groups.  The research 
process was approved as exempt under Category 2 on December 28, 2007, by The Ohio 
State University Institutional Review Board (IRB), Protocol #207E0871. 
B.   TARGET AUDIENCE  
The Regional MFM Catastrophe Surge Survey targeted the three lead groups 
involved in MFM under Ohio Revised Code, state planning documents, and existing 
national guidance.  The survey was designed to gather information as well as raise MFM 
awareness in the target audiences to include county coroners, county emergency 
management directors, and city and county health commissioners.  The sample frame 
covered the entire population of each group, creating an ideal sampling situation in terms 
of probability and, ultimately, for generalizing the results (Schonlau et al., 2002, p. 5).   
There are 88 coroners in Ohio, one per county.  County coroners in Ohio include 
licensed physicians who investigate sudden and/or suspicious deaths and perform 
autopsies in connection with the deaths as well as licensed physicians who investigate 
such deaths but who do not perform autopsies (Ohio State Coroners Association, 2005).  
The coroner is elected on a quadrennial basis with jurisdictional oversight within the 
county’s border (ORC 313.01). Although county coroners are responsible for the 
investigation of death during sudden and/or suspicious circumstances, their investigative 
role would not extend to every death in PI once pandemic causation was established.  The 
county coroner would still play a primary role in MFM as the official custodian of the 
morgue (ORC 313.08).  In addition, the coroner is ultimately responsible for death 
certification should there be no attending physician (ORC 3705.16). 
There are 88 Ohio county emergency management directors, each appointed by 
the county commissioners and the chief executive of all or a majority of the other 
political subdivisions within the county (ORC 5502.26).  The emergency management 
director serves at the will of his or her appointing body, some entering contractual 
agreements with the county commissioners and chief executives of the political 
subdivisions.  The Ohio Emergency Management Agency and the county emergency 
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management agencies are responsible for coordination functions in disaster and this 
function is established in the Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 5502:  “the Ohio Emergency 
Management Agency is the central point of coordination within the state for response and 
recovery to disasters (Ohio Department of Public Safety, 2005).”  Emphasis on the MFM 
response and recovery role for this target audience is on coordination, not on command 
and control or lead agent status. 
There were 132 health commissioners in Ohio, both city and county, at the time of 
the survey’s distribution.  Ohio’s public health system is divided into health districts that 
can be city, county (a combination of villages and townships into a general health 
district), or combinations thereof (ORC 3709.01).  A board of health governs each health 
district, with each board member appointed to a service term by a district advisory 
council, city’s chief executive officer, or a combination thereof.  The board of health, in 
turn, is required to appoint a qualified health commissioner as the executive officer of the 
district (ORC 3709.11, 3709.14).  The health commissioner must execute the board of 
health orders and state health department administrative code to include the enforcement 
of sanitary regulations and keeping the public informed in regard to all matters affecting 
the health of the district.   Public health is identified as Ohio’s primary agency and lead 
for MFM in ESF 8 (OEMA 2007a, p. 8~1; 2007b, p. 8~35; 2007c, p. 8~79). 
C. SUMMARY 
The Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge Survey was 
developed as an internet survey and delivered as a web-based product through 
SurveyMonkey.  Due to the nature of the closed sampling frame (i.e., the total population 
of all three target groups was known along with each member’s publicly available email 
address), the internet survey presented a relatively low cost and timely way to research 
baseline information about MFM gaps and operational understanding in Ohio.  The 
survey, piloted and revised in a three-step process, was fielded over a period of 19 days 
with weekly email reminders following an initial invitation.  The survey closed three days 
after a final email notice was sent to all participants.  This last notice included the 
response rates from each of the eight HLS regions in Ohio for competitive motivation.  
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The target population included 88 county coroners, 88 county emergency management 
directors, and 132 city and county health commissioners.  All of the surveys and samples 
of the email communications with the potential participants are found in Appendix A.     
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IV.   RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The survey results from each of three target audiences are presented in this 
chapter using response and data points from each of the three surveys:  Regional Mass 
Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge:  County Coroners; Regional Mass Fatality 
Management in Catastrophe Surge:  County Emergency Managers; and Regional Mass 
Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge: City and County Health Commissioners.  
Copies of the surveys and a combined survey version of each question by target audience 
and question category are found in Appendix A.  The survey results for each group were 
obtained directly from SurveyMonkey.  The internet-based SurveyMonkey allows the 
researcher to analyze the survey results directly from a response summary page, viewing 
data for each question to include total response counts, percentages, respondent count, 
and response averages (The SurveyMonkey Team, 2008, p. 74).  Questions tagged for 
additional analysis were then imported into a SPSS-PC database for inferential statistical 
analysis between and among respondent groups.  Supplemental information related to the 
data results and analysis is found in Appendix B, referenced throughout this chapter.  The 
data analysis is considered with implications for MFM planning, response, and recovery 
towards the end of this chapter.   
A. RESULTS 
The survey included 38 questions for health commissioners, 37 questions for 
county emergency management directors, and 34 questions for county coroners.  The 
sample frame covered the entire population of each group, creating an ideal sampling 
situation in terms of probability (Schonlau et al., 2002, p. 5).  The targeted population 
totaled 308 across the three audience sectors, and the total response rate for the Regional 
Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge Survey was 45% (n=137).  The 
narrative summary of the results for each group are found in the chapter sections that 
follow, along with accompanying displays of select target group survey responses in 
Appendix B. 
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1. County Coroners 
a. Response Rate and Demographics 
There are 88 coroners in Ohio, one per county.  The coroner is elected on 
a quadrennial basis with jurisdictional oversight within the county’s border (ORC 
313.01).  Thirty county coroners completed the survey, with a response rate of 34% 
across Ohio.  Most responding coroners (59%) have been in their positions over 10 years 
with 21% serving over 21 years.  By law, the county coroner in Ohio is a physician.  
There were no county coroners responding from three homeland security (HLS) regions:  
West Central and Southeast 1 and 2. 
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select County Coroner Responses, 
“Demographics, Questions 27-34.” 
b. General Awareness, Command-Control (C2), and Coordination   
The majority of county coroners (53%) state that they are the lead agent 
for coordination of MFM in their jurisdictions (i.e., counties) and 57% of coroners 
believe that at least some level of regional planning is occurring.  They identify public 
health, emergency management, and funeral directors as the main partners who should be 
involved in MFM within the jurisdiction, but do not believe that funeral directors are as 
involved as they should be.  When asked regarding the lead agent for command and 
control (C2) of MFM during an incident affecting their jurisdiction, 33% believe that 
Unified Command with multiple leads is appropriate while 27% identify the county 
coroner and 23% identify emergency management as the C2 lead.  When it comes to 
coordination of MFM efforts, 53% of the county coroners identify emergency 
management as the lead agent, while 23% identify the coordination point within public 
health.  Another 23% believe that MFM coordination is a county coroner function. 
County coroners are overwhelmingly confident (86%) about their ability 
to work with their identified jurisdictional partners (public health, emergency 
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management, and funeral directors).  There is confusion in their ranks about whether a 
mass fatality related to Pandemic Influenza should be considered a coroner’s case.  Over 
half of them (53%) are aware of the state’s release of a traditional MFM planning 
document, but fewer (37%) believe that the current state guidance is going to help them 
in PI.  In fact, the county coroners are divided as to whether the state partners are really 
capable of working together to accomplish the needed MFM guidance.    
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Coroner Responses, “General Awareness, 
Command-Control, and Coordination, Questions 1-14.” 
c. Current MFM Planning and Operations 
As many county coroners disagree (42%) as agree (42%) that their 
jurisdictions have pre-identified community collection points for bodies and possess 
morgues meeting temperature requirements for storage of the bodies.  A further analysis 
reveals that there is no HLS region differences in the responses (i.e., the 
disagreement/agreement is within each of the regions as opposed to being affected by the 
coroners’ identified HLS region.)  The same trend of a divided response shows up in the 
coroners’ confidence that volunteers are currently trained and organized to help and 
support MFM efforts and jurisdictional plans to augment existing morgue space.  Forty 
percent (40%) of the county coroners disagree that volunteers for surge response are 
present and another 43% agree that they are, again, with no HLS regional differentiation.  
Thirty-seven (37%) of the coroners disagree that their jurisdiction has augmentation plans 
and 37% agree, the divide unaffected by HLS regional identification. 
The majority of coroners do not believe that they have access to critical 
resources for MFM.  The only MFM resource options that the majority of county 
coroners identify as currently accessible are the labor pool and transportation; they deem 
access to all other resources (supplies, personal protective equipment [PPE], vaccines, 
fuel, raw materials, communication bandwidth, and security) as questionable or not 
currently available.  They identify a lack of resources related to the stockpiling of critical 
supplies as well as gaining access to prioritized resources (e.g., water, generators, and 
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gasoline).  For example, 51 % of coroners disagree and another 17% are neutral that they 
have even a 10-day supply of critical supply stockpiles to support MFM operations.  
They are not confident in the existing communication lines and authority at the local, 
regional, and state levels for response once the death surge occurs, but are more confident 
(67%) in their jurisdiction’s leaders and public information officers’ ability to deliver 
honest and timely information to the community. 
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Coroner Responses, “Current MFM 
Planning and Operations, Questions 15-26.” 
d. Perception of Operational Strengths, Weaknesses, and Barriers 
The county coroners were asked to provide answers to two narrative 
statements towards the end of the survey:  “The best thing my jurisdiction has going in 
terms of MFM is __” and “The thing that worries me the most in terms of MFM is __.”  
In response to the first statement, 54% of the county coroners identify existing 
partnerships as the best thing in their jurisdiction.  Many of those responding favorably to 
the existing jurisdictional partnerships maintain that their small, tight-knit communities 
enhance their ability to work together.  The second “best” category identified (33%) is 
the jurisdictional (county) pre-planning that has already been accomplished.   
On the flip side of the coin, 54% of county coroners list a lack of 
resources, including PPE, body bags, identified leaders, limited manpower, and morgue 
space, as their biggest worry.  A lack of planning is identified as a second-place worry 
(33%) by the coroners, the same percentage identifying it as a strength.   
When asked about barriers to a successful MFM in the jurisdiction, most 
county coroners identify financial barriers (69%) and specifically indicate that their 
inability to stockpile even ten days of supplies is due to their current budgets.  Ironically, 
the same “small community” relationship identified as a strength earlier is named as a 
fiscal liability in the barrier section.  One coroner concludes by stating:  “I am not sure 
that all parties have come to adequate conclusions over multiple areas of the MFM -  
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some have been addressed, others we have not been able to get everyone together to 
discuss overall. A STATE RUN [sic] organizational symposium involving each county 
and their respective ‘bosses’ would be great.” This was an Anonymous County Coroner 
Respondent, (2008), Regional mass fatality management in catastrophe surge:  County 
coroners, Regional mass fatality management in catastrophe surge survey, Columbus, 
Ohio:  The Ohio State University, Question 29. 
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Coroner Responses, “Perceptions of 
Operational Strengths, Weaknesses and Barriers, Questions 27-29.” 
2. County Emergency Management Directors 
a. Response Rate and Demographics 
There are 88 Ohio county emergency management directors, each 
appointed by the county commissioners and the chief executive of all or a majority of the 
other political subdivisions within the county (ORC 5502.26).  Forty (40) emergency 
management directors completed the survey equating with a response rate of 46% across 
the state.  Most responding emergency management directors (64%) have been in their 
positions less than 10 years with 33% serving less than five (5) years.  Most directors are 
middle-aged adults: 89% between the ages of 36-65 years of age.  When asked about 
their professional identity, 97% of the respondents chose “emergency management,” 
emphasizing the fact that emergency management is recognized as a professional 
discipline in and of itself.  This is an especially interesting response in that this option 
was not provided in the survey and the respondents had to write in this response.  No 
county emergency management directors responded from the Northeast HLS Region.  
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Emergency Management Responses, 
“Demographics, Questions 34-38.” 
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b. General Awareness, Command-Control (C2), and Coordination 
Emergency management directors at the county level are not sure about 
their agency’s role in leading MFM coordination.  While 33% believe that they are not 
the lead agency for coordinating MFM in their jurisdictions (i.e., counties), another 30% 
neither agree nor disagree, and 18% believe that emergency management is the lead 
coordinator.  The majority of emergency management directors do believe that some 
level of regional planning is occurring (54%).  They identify public health, funeral 
directors, county coroners, and mental health as the main partners who should be 
involved in MFM within the jurisdiction, along with the Emergency Medical System 
(EMS) and the American Red Cross (ARC) by their written response option.  They do not 
believe, though, that funeral directors, county coroners, and mental health are as involved 
in MFM as they should be.  When asked regarding the lead agent for command and 
control (C2) of MFM during an incident affecting their jurisdiction, 45% believe that 
Unified Command with multiple leads is appropriate, while 37% identify the county 
coroner as the C2 lead.  When it comes to coordination of MFM efforts, 41% of the 
emergency management directors also identify county coroners as the lead agent.  
Another 30% identify the coordination point within public health and 27% within their 
own emergency management area. 
Emergency management directors are very confident (90%) about their 
ability to work with their jurisdictional partners to achieve MFM capability.  Over half of 
them (58%) are aware of the state’s release of a traditional MFM planning document.  
Fewer (34%) believe that the current state guidance is going to be any help to them in PI.  
Apart from the lead agency status for C2 and/or coordination at the local jurisdictional 
level, 52% believe that the Ohio Department of Health is the lead agency for MFM 
coordination at the state level.  Emergency management directors are not confident (61%) 
that the state partners can work together to accomplish MFM guidance and planning.   
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Emergency Management Responses, 
“General Awareness, Command-Control, and Coordination, Questions 1-14.” 
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c. Current MFM Planning and Operations  
Emergency management directors express confidence in their agency’s 
ability to assist the funeral industry to obtain the resources that it needs to conduct MFM.  
The only resource that the majority of directors identify as beyond their ability to attain is 
the vaccine supply.  All other resources (labor, supplies, personal protective equipment 
[PPE], fuel, raw materials, communication bandwidth, transportation, and security) are 
viewed as attainable through emergency management access.  The emergency 
management directors are also confident (76%) that uniform procedures have been 
established to request critical assistance from the state to expedite operations.  The 
directors disagree, however, that their respective jurisdictions have established viable 
plans to augment morgue space (58%), with 21% not knowing whether the task has been 
accomplished.   
When it comes to accessing current stockpiles of critical MFM supplies or 
pre-identifying temporary mass burial sites and cremation arrangements for death surge, 
emergency management directors do not believe that their jurisdiction has addressed 
planning for these critical elements of MFM.  That is, their previous confidence regarding 
access to MFM resources does equate with confidence in sustaining the supply flow 
beyond the first 72 hours, the point at which the traditional jurisdictional response 
capability counts on state and federal assets for assistance.  Fifty-three (53%) of directors 
disagree that they have access to a stockpile of critical supplies to support MFM 
operations for even 10 days.  Fifty-five percent (55%) do not believe that their 
jurisdiction has pre-identified temporary burial sites or alternate cremation operations and 
another 26% cannot say one way or the other whether this has occurred.  Neither are they 
confident that the existing lines of communication and authority at the local, regional, 
and state levels will provide the best possible outcomes in death surge.  The emergency 
management directors are confident (55%) in their jurisdiction’s leaders and public 
information officers’ ability to deliver honest and timely information to the community 
before, during, and after the incident. 
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Forty-five percent (45%) of emergency management directors identify the 
Citizen’s Corps as a viable source of volunteers for MFM operations.  In contrast to that 
group of volunteers, however, most directors (58%) do not believe that the Medical 
Reserve Corps (MRC) will provide assistance for MFM.  Comments given in conjunction 
with the MRC question indicate that this group will most likely be dealing with the life 
safety issues and not with dead bodies.  The emergency managers in their comments do 
not propose the idea of MRC participation in family assistance activities.  While there is 
agreement that their respective jurisdiction has collected and prepared public information 
and educational messages related to MFM that will help families (53%), the ability to 
provide family support centers in the middle of pandemic influenza is less assured, with 
29% in disagreement and 40% unable to determine whether there is capacity or not 
(neither agree or disagree.)  The jury also remains out on the jurisdictional ability to 
provide MFM family assistance to special populations (e.g., those with mental or 
behavioral illnesses or disabilities.) 
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Emergency Management Responses, 
“Current MFM Planning and Operations, Questions 15-30.” 
d. Perception of Operational Strengths, Weaknesses, and Barriers 
Like the county coroners, emergency management directors were given 
the opportunity to turn to narrative responses and big picture views just prior to 
concluding the survey.  They responded to the same two statements:  “The best thing my 
jurisdiction has going in terms of MFM is __” and “The thing that worries me the most in 
terms of MFM is __.”  In response to the first statement, 68% of the emergency 
management directors identify their existing jurisdictional partners as a major strength.  
Twenty-nine (29%) also identify jurisdictional pre-planning for MFM as a strength.   
The majority (54%) of emergency management directors identify general 
infrastructure capacity for MFM at the county level as their major worry in MFM.  One 
director states:  “Apathy!  I cannot get the Coroner or the Funeral Homes to come to the 
table to talk. The county health department is great and has been attempting to play catch-
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up.  [They are] the lead in some areas? [Sic]” This was an Anonymous Emergency 
Management Director Respondent, 2008, Regional mass fatality management in 
catastrophe surge:  Emergency management directors, Regional mass fatality 
management in catastrophe surge survey, Columbus, Ohio:  The Ohio State University, 
Question 33.   
Another lists this concern:  “The loss of essential services and utilities and 
control will create anarchy and social upheaval.”  This was from an Anonymous 
Emergency Management Director Respondent, Question 33.   
When listing additional worries, 43% of emergency managers name a lack 
of resources to include the availability of manpower, general stockpiles of supplies, and 
morgue space.  That is, even though they are confident in their abilities to assist in 
obtaining initial resources for the MFM incident, their written comments indicate that the 
emergency management directors are not at all confident in the county’s ability to sustain 
the needed flow of critical supplies for MFM capability in response and recovery. 
When asked about barriers to a successful MFM in their county, most 
(69%) emergency management directors identify financial barriers, indicating that 
stockpiling supplies is unattainable given current dollars and competing interests 
involving the living during a pandemic.  Many also indicate that their counties are in 
economically depressed areas to begin with.   
One emergency management director asks:  “Who’s gonna pay?” and 
another states:  “It always comes down to financials.”  This was from an Anonymous 
Emergency Management Director Respondent, Question 33.    
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Emergency Management Responses, 
“Perceptions of Operational Strengths, Weaknesses and Barriers, Questions 31-33.” 
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3. County and City Health Commissioners 
a. Response Rate and Demographics 
There were 132 health commissioners in Ohio, both city and county, at the 
time of the survey’s fielding.  Ohio’s public health system is divided into health districts 
that can be city, county (a combination of villages and townships into a general health 
district), or combinations thereof (ORC 3709.01).  Sixty-seven (67) health commissioners 
completed the survey, a response rate of 51%.  Most responding health commissioners 
(66%) have been in their positions less than 10 years with 34% serving less than five (5) 
years.  Most health commissioners are middle-aged adults with 97% between the ages of 
36-65 years of age.  Forty-six percent (46%) of health commissioners identified their 
jurisdiction as the county, 29% as a combined district, and 25% as a city. When asked 
about their professional identity, 50% of the respondents chose either “nurse” or 
“sanitarian” equally.  Health commissioners responded from each of Ohio’s HLS regions.   
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Health Commissioner Responses, 
“Demographics, Questions 32-37.” 
b. General Awareness, Command-Control (C2), and Coordination 
The health commissioner group does not believe that public health is the 
lead for MFM coordination in Ohio (57%).  They strongly believe that MFM planning is 
occurring at the regional level (70%), with 51% of the respondents indicating that their 
agency has entered into Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) for regional 
assistance.  They identify public health, funeral directors, county coroners, and mental 
health as the main partners who should be involved in MFM within the jurisdiction, along 
with hospitals and faith-based organizations in their written response option for the 
question.  Health commissioners do not believe, however, that funeral directors, county 
coroners, and mental health are as involved in MFM as they should be.  When asked to 
identify the lead agent for command and control (C2) of MFM during an incident 
affecting their jurisdiction, 35% believe that Unified Command with multiple leads is 
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appropriate while 27% identify emergency management and 26% identify county 
coroners as the C2 lead.  When it comes to coordination of MFM efforts, 43% of the 
health commissioners identify emergency management as the lead agency while 33% 
identify county coroners as the coordination point.  Only 25% of health commissioners 
believe that they should be coordinating MFM efforts as the lead agency.   
Health commissioners are extremely confident (82%) about their ability to 
work with their jurisdictional partners in Ohio to achieve MFM capability.  The health 
commissioners (69%) are not sure whether mass fatalities related to PI would be 
considered coroner’s cases or not.  Over half of them (59%) are aware of the state’s 
release of a traditional MFM planning document, but significantly fewer (27%) believe 
that the current state guidance is going to be any help to them in a pandemic incident.  In 
contrast to identifying their agency as the jurisdictional lead agency for C2 and/or 
coordination, thirty-eight percent (38%) believe that the Ohio Department of Health is the 
lead agency for MFM coordination at the state level; another thirty-two percent (32%) 
identify the Ohio Emergency Management Agency in that role.  Several health 
commissioners entered comments indicating their lack of knowledge regarding a state 
lead for MFM.  Health commissioners are pessimistic (68%) about the state partners 
ability to work together to accomplish MFM guidance and planning.   
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Health Commissioner Responses, “General 
Awareness, Command-Control, and Coordination, Questions 1-14.” 
c. Current MFM Planning and Operations  
Health commissioners express confidence in public health’s ability to 
assist the funeral industry to obtain the vaccine and communication bandwidth resources, 
but are not so confident about the availability of other resources such as fuel, raw 
materials, transportation, and security.  There are other resource areas where the health 
commissioners are divided in terms of their assistance ability to include labor, general 
supplies, and personal protective equipment (PPE).  The majority of health 
commissioners do not believe that their jurisdiction’s volunteers are ready to support 
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MFM efforts (53%), yet they believe that the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) could be a 
viable source to expand MFM expertise (55%).  Most are confident in the jurisdictional 
agency’s ability to process and track fatalities through the Electronic Death Registration 
System (EDRS) during MFM (53%).  
Pre-identification of temporary mass burial sites or cremation 
arrangements for death surge is not believed to have been completed in their jurisdictions 
at this time, with only 27% of health commissioners agreeing that these arrangements 
have been made.  They are not confident about the existing lines of communication and 
authority at the local, regional, and state levels achieving the best possible outcomes in 
death surge.  Health commissioners are confident (56%) in their jurisdiction’s leaders and 
public information officers’ ability to deliver honest and timely information to the 
community before, during, and after the incident. 
While there is agreement that their respective jurisdiction has collected 
and prepared public information and educational messages related to MFM that will help 
families (55%), the ability to provide family support centers in the middle of pandemic 
influenza is less assured, with 26% disagreeing that there is capability and 50% not 
willing or unable to say (neither agree or disagree.)  Health commissioners are also not 
confident of a jurisdictional ability to provide MFM family assistance regarding special 
needs populations (e.g., those with mental or behavioral illnesses or disabilities.) 
Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Health Commissioner Responses, “Current 
MFM Planning and Operations, Questions 15-28.” 
d. Perception of Operational Strengths, Weaknesses, and Barriers 
Like the county coroners and emergency management directors, health 
commissioners were given the opportunity to present big picture, narrative responses just 
prior to concluding the survey.  They responded to the same two statements:  “The best 
thing my jurisdiction has going in terms of MFM is __” and “The thing that worries me 
the most in terms of MFM is __.”  In response to the first statement, 69% of the health  
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commissioners identified the existing partners in their jurisdiction as a major MFM 
strength.  There was no close-second strength named, although health commissioners also 
identified jurisdictional pre-planning and in-county MOUs as strengths.    
Forty percent (40%) of the health commissioners identified general 
infrastructure capacity at the county level as their major worry in MFM.  One health 
commissioner went as far as to say the following:  “Public health has no business taking 
the lead in MFM.  [Public health is] great for assisting with parts of the plan but public 
health does not have specialized mortuary care/services capabilities.”  This was from an 
Anonymous Health Commissioner Respondent, (2008), Regional mass fatality 
management in catastrophe surge:  Health commissioners,” Regional mass fatality 
management in catastrophe surge survey, Columbus, Ohio:  The Ohio State University, 
Question 31.   
When voicing additional worries, 20% of health commissioners identified 
a lack of resources and another 20% identified a lack of state guidance.  As one health 
commissioner states:  “There are great discrepancies between MFM regional responses in 
Ohio.  For this to be a strong response we need to work more collaboratively among 
regions and the state to coordinate this specific response. There is little guidance from the 
state regarding MFM response in terms of a pandemic.”  This was from an Anonymous 
Health Commissioner Respondent, Question 31. 
When asked about barriers to a successful MFM in the jurisdiction, the 
health commissioners equally identified both financial barriers (43%) and operational 
barriers (43%).  Another fifteen percent (15%) listed legal barriers as their most serious 
concern.  While health commissioners indicate that they are used to working within 
austere funding realities, they indicate that the recent decreases in preparedness funding 
at the county level leave them unprepared for a local MFM response.  One health 
commissioner summarizes the situation:  “Financial, Legal and Organizational.  It all 
boils down to resources!  We would be stressed at the local level to come up with the 
numbers of people necessary to handle any significant event.”  This is from an 
Anonymous Health Commissioner Respondent, Question 31. 
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Select detailed responses to survey questions covered in this narrative 
section are found in Appendix B under Select Health Commissioner Responses, 
“Perceptions of Operational Strengths, Weaknesses and Barriers, Questions 29-31.” 
B. ANALYSIS 
The responses by individual group (county coroners, emergency management 
directors, and health commissioners) were comparatively analyzed using both descriptive 
and inferential techniques.  For most of the inferential statistical analysis, the Kruskal-
Wallis nonparametric technique was used given the ordinal data results with independent 
groups (Munro, 1997, p. 109).  Data results were compared for the three groups on 
appropriate questions with the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
with the subjects converted into ranks and the analysis comparing the mean rank in each 
group.  By and far, there were no indicators of significance through this analysis, 
accomplished through the SPSS-PC database.  When examining the data results, the lack 
of significant differences between groups can be explained by two data trends.  First, 
there is a general lack of agreement within the groups by response (i.e., differential 
responses within the groups, which scattered the ranked means of the ordinal data).  
Second, there is sameness in the agreement or disagreement data point response across 
groups when the responses are differentiated.  The significant differences determined by 
the inferential analysis are detailed in the appropriate sections below.  In addition, each 
data result section was analyzed across the groups using the descriptive data results to 
illuminate some directional implications for MFM “next steps.”  Finally, written 
responses to open-ended survey questions were qualitatively analyzed using both a word 
count and word cloud approach. 
1. Response Rate and Demographics 
A select analysis of the demographic data by majority response across the 
surveys’ target audiences is found in Table 2.  Most county coroners are physicians with 
numerous service years in their position.  They are an older group, with almost one-fifth 
over sixty-five (65+) years of age.  Their overall age combined with their years of 
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experience indicates stability in the county coroner ranks, even though the position is an 
elected one.  In contrast, most emergency management directors and health 
commissioners have served in their appointed positions less than ten years, with half of 
that group serving less than five years.  Even though the majority of both target groups 
fall into the same range of fifty-one to sixty-five (51-65) years of age, the emergency 
management directors and health commissioners are younger overall than the county 
coroners.  It could be that the response rates to the internet-based survey reflect the age 
differential between the groups.  That is, the lower county coroner response rate reflects a 
lower comfort level or desire to respond to email invites and internet based surveys that is 
age-related.  The lack of response to the survey by target audiences in some of the HLS 
regions is not consistent across groups.  That is, the non-response is not pervasive across 
any one HLS region when all of the three groups are taken into account.  This lack of 
consistency combined with the healthy internet-based survey response rate overall (45%) 
and complete-population sampling frame bodes well for generalizing results across the 










Years in Position > 10 Years (68%) < 10 Years (64%) < 5 Years (33%) 
< 10 Years (66%) 
< 5 Years (34%) 
Professional 
Identification Physician (100%) 
Emergency 
Management (97%) 
Nurse or Sanitarian 
(54%) 
Age 51-65 Years (46%) 65+ Years (18%)  
36-50 Years (41%) 
51-65 Years (49%) 
36-50 Years (43%) 
51-65 Years (54%) 
County, City, or 






Northwest and Central 
(50% ) 
Non-responding:  
West Central & 
Southeast 1&2 




Northeast Central and 
Northwest (44%) 
Non-responding:  N/A 
Table 2.   Analysis of Demographic Data by Majority Response across Target 
Audiences 
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2. General Awareness, Command-Control, and Coordination 
A select analysis of the target audiences’ perceptions regarding MFM command 
and control (C2) and coordination as well as general awareness of MFM planning 
(Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge Survey, Questions 1-14) is 
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Ohio Department of 









Table 3.   Analysis of Command and Control, Coordination, and Plan Awareness Data 
across Target Audiences  
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There is no agreement within or across groups regarding who is supposed to be 
the lead agent or agency for MFM C2.  At the same time, no one group is really excited 
about taking charge.  The county coroners believe that Unified Command is the way to 
go but they do indicate that they consider themselves a close second for ensuring C2.  
Unified Command.  In incidents involving multiple jurisdictions, a single 
jurisdiction with multiagency involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with 
multiagency involvement, unified command allows agencies with different 
legal, geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities to work 
together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, 
responsibility, or accountability. (NIMS Online.com, 2004). 
The emergency management directors and the health commissioners both like the idea of 
Unified Command, but most emergency managers believe that the county coroner is the 
C2 lead agent and health commissioners, the majority (> 90%) wanting no part as the 
lead in MFM, believe that emergency management is the lead.  This, of course, presents 
an issue.  Emergency management is not tasked with command and control functions 
under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and public health is the clearly 
delineated MFM lead at the federal and state levels.   
When it comes to coordination of MFM preparedness, response, and recovery, 
emergency management is off the hook according to the responding emergency 
management directors.  This belief belies the fact that emergency management is the 
designated central point of coordination for response and recovery to disaster.  The 
emergency managers indicate that county coroners should be coordinating the MFM 
effort, while the majority of both the county coroners and health commissioners believe 
the coordination responsibility validly rests with emergency management.  Both 
emergency management directors and health commissioners believe, however, that the 
Ohio Department of Health (ODH) is the lead coordinating agency at the state level while 
the county coroners identify the Ohio Emergency Management Agency (OEMA).  Even 
the health commissioners name OEMA as a close second behind ODH for state 
coordination. 
Regardless of the confusion over C2 and coordination of MFM planning, 
response, and recovery, the respondents believe that there are workable partnerships in 
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place at the jurisdictional level.  Each group agrees/strongly agrees (>80%) that they can 
locally partner to achieve MFM capability.  While the majority of all respondents from 
all groups are aware of Ohio’s release of the Acute Mass Fatalities Incident Response 
Plan, most respondents indicate that they have no idea what is actually in the plan or if it 
could really help MFM response in PI, with greater than fifty percent (>50%) choosing 
the “neither agree or disagree” option for Question 11 in each group.  This response has 
major implications for the release of Ohio’s Non-Acute Mass Fatalities Incident 
Response Plan slated for the fall of 2008.  Paper plans need peopled participation for true 
operational capability.  The uncertainty continues on to the question on determination of 
a PI death as a coroner’s case with not just the emergency managers but also the county 
coroners.  This indecision is most likely affecting the respondents’ view of C2 status, as 
well. 
There is one area that all three groups of respondents understand:  who should be 
and who actually is at the table for MFM planning are not one and the same.  In a 
correlated T-test, each of the groups showed significant differences in their response to 
Question 4 versus Question 5.  The results are shown in Table 4. A review of the 
responses indicates that the county coroners believe funeral directors are being left out of 
the planning; emergency managers believe that both funeral directors and mental health 
are being omitted; and health commissioners believe that funeral directors, mental health, 
and county coroners are not being included in MFM capability building. 
 
PAIRED SAMPLES TEST – Paired Differences  PARTNERS 
Who is involved  
versus 
Who should be involved? Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean T df Sig. (2-tailed) 








.825 .708 .089 9.253 62 .000
Table 4.   Paired T-Test Analysis of Question 4 and 5 by Target Audiences  
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Question 14 was the one question in this section that showed a statistical 
difference among the groups.9  When it comes to confidence in Ohio’s ability to bring 
regional and state consistency to MFM through the planning process, the county coroners 
are much more optimistic than are the emergency management directors and the health 
commissioners.   
These responses in this section underscore the confusion existing regarding MFM 
C2 and coordination.  It would appear that none of the key stakeholders understands who 
is or who should be leading or coordinating the MFM effort.  This state of affairs 
obviously impacts any consistency in MFM planning.  In addition, the three groups agree 
that those who should be involved in MFM planning, especially those in the funeral 
director and mental health provider communities, are not at the table.    
3. Current MFM Planning and Operations  
A select analysis of the target audiences’ perceptions regarding current MFM 
planning and operations (Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge:  
County Coroners, Questions 15-26; Regional MFM in Catastrophe Surge:  County 
Emergency Managers, Questions 15-30; and Regional MFM in Catastrophe Surge: City 
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Table 5.   Analysis of Current MFM Planning and Operations across Target Audiences  
There appears to be a general lack of county coroner confidence in the 
jurisdictional ability to get resources to the funeral industry during a catastrophic death 
surge.  The items for the resource listing in Question 15 were reviewed with the Ohio 
County Coroners Association board members prior to building the question, and it 
appears that the board’s concern about sustainment of death surge operations is shared by 
their entire group.  This is not so with emergency management and public health.  In fact, 
the major resource concern that emergency management directors have is over obtaining 
vaccines from the public health system.  The health commissioners, in turn, have no 
worries over obtaining health protection related resources for the funeral industry in their 
region; their only resource worries relate to emergency management areas of 
coordination:  transportation and fuel, along with security.  The differential on this 
question alone would give rise to a concern that the groups are not talking to each other 
or, at the very least, are planning for MFM in isolation.  The coup de grâce indicator that 
this isolation may be reality is the pervasive belief and confidence across the groups that 
they have the procedures in place to request critical assistance from the state.  That is,  
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every group is continuing to count on a traditional, vertical emergency management 
response (local – state – federal) in a pandemic environment affecting all resources and 
all geo-locations at once in all-hands on deck, parallel need.    
Further evidence of this “we’re counting on the state and feds” thinking is 
apparent in the responses to questions involving the expansion of MFM operations 
jurisdictionally to address catastrophic surge.  None of the three groups has confidence in 
the jurisdictional (local) ability to sustain an increase in morgue space, that they have 
addressed MFM protocols, or that their respective jurisdictions have addressed temporary 
mass burial or allowed for adjustments in cremation operations to address death surge 
(Table 4).  The county coroners (60%) and emergency managers (53%) admit that they 
do not have even a 10-day stockpile of critical MFM supplies in their locales.  In 
addition, all three groups clearly indicate that they just do not know about trained and 
organized volunteer support for MFM as evidenced by the spread responses across the 
strongly disagree to strongly agree continuum for Question 19 (county coroners and 
emergency managers) and Question 16 (health commissioners.)   
In spite of this widespread lack of confidence and doubt, the groups tend to rally 
around the ability of traditional lines of communication and authority in disaster (local-
state-federal) to ensure the best possible outcome in MFM (Table 5).  The health 
commissioners are a bit more distrustful regarding this traditional capability, however.  
The county coroners (67%), emergency management directors (55%), and health 
commissioners (56%) all have confidence in their jurisdictional governmental leaders and 
public information officers to deliver honest and timely MFM information to the 
community, even in light of the operational deficits previously identified. 
In summary, given the traditional disaster response thinking about MFM on the 
part of the key stakeholder groups in combination with the identification of the MFM 
operational response and recovery deficits, it would appear that the target audiences are 
counting on the state and federal backup to calm the catastrophic MFM deficits in their 
hour of jurisdictional need.      
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4. Perception of Operational Strengths, Weaknesses, and Barriers 
All three groups identify their existing partners in disaster response as their major 
MFM strength.  Respondents indicate that they already talk with these partner agencies, 
are comfortable in that communication flow for the most part, and are counting on these 
previous relationships to get their jurisdiction through the death surge.  Another strength 
listed by both the coroners and the emergency managers is the perception that some level 
of pre-planning for MFM is exists at the county level.  Of course, just as many coroners 
also listed the lack of MFM pre-planning as their top worry.  
Using Wordle Create (Feinberg, 2008), a “word cloud” was generated from the 
combined text responses that the target audiences provided in their response to:  “The 
best thing my jurisdiction has going in terms of MFM is __ “ and is found in Figure 3.  
The cloud configuration gives greater prominence to words that appear more frequently 
in the source text, actually providing a qualitative analytical graphic of the survey 
response.  It is obvious in this word cloud that the existing partnerships take first seat in 
terms of existing jurisdictional strengths that would support MFM capability. 
 
Figure 3.   Wordle Word Cloud from Across-Group Perceptions of MFM Strengths   
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There is no one chink in the MFM armor on which the target audience agrees.  
Planners working in the medical and public health surge field refer to three major 
categories of need:  stuff, staff, and systems (Barbisch, 2006).  These needs are present 
regardless whether the surge involves the living or the dead, and the needs obviously 
become much more chaotic in catastrophe.  Stuff involves supplies and equipment; staff 
involves manpower for both response and recovery; and systems involve the 
infrastructure needed to ensure surge capability.  Most often, as covered in the previous 
literature review in Chapter II, the emphasis in surge planning has been on the right stuff 
(i.e., equipment and supplies), with staff hovering at a close second.  It is interesting that 
both the emergency managers and health commissioners identify infrastructure, or the 
system, as their number one worry.  This selection may show their maturity in awareness 
regarding the MFM planning effort.  Health commissioners introduce yet another factor 
into the worry equation:  state guidance.  It is clear by their voicing this worry that they 
are looking to the state to lay the framework for MFM response.  Of all three groups, 
health commissioners probably best understand the parallel demand implications of a 
non-geographic based catastrophic incident such as a pandemic.  All three groups do 
voice their concern, as well, about resources in terms of MFM weakness in preparedness:  
a primary concern for coroners and a secondary one for emergency management directors 
and health commissioners.  
Another word cloud was generated from the combined text responses that the 
target audiences provided in their response to:  “The thing that worries me the most in 
terms of MFM is __ “ and is found in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4.   Wordle Word Cloud from Across-Group Perception of MFM Weaknesses   
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All three groups list financial barriers as a major barrier to successful MFM 
planning in their jurisdictions.  There is a pervasive theme in the respondent perceptions 
that if only they could obtain the money to get the stuff and staff, the equipment, 
supplies, and manpower, they would successfully manage mass fatality – even in 
catastrophic surge.  The health commissioner group did have a bit of a different take on 
this view.  In fact, they were the only group that identified a financial and operational 
duality as the “biggest barrier.”  They were the only group that listed legal barriers, as 
well.  This difference in response did approach statistical significance for the health 
commissioner target audience when analyzed against the other two groups.10  
   
 
Figure 5.   Wordle Word Cloud from Across-Group Perception of MFM Barriers 
                                                 
10 Kruskal-Wallis: Chi-Square of 5.104, df 2, and Asymp. Sig. @ .078. 
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C. SUMMARY SURVEY IMPLICATIONS 
County coroners, emergency management directors, and health commissioners are 
the key stakeholders and in positions of authority to address mass fatality management in 
the State of Ohio.  These individuals are mature professionals with disciplinary-
specialized expertise.  They understand their responsibilities to their communities, most 
often defining their jurisdiction at the county level.  Although the survey presented a 
unique opportunity for the respondents to think about MFM concepts, reality based 
planning that translates into operational response and recovery has not yet been 
accomplished when addressing catastrophic death surge related to a non-scene based 
incident like a pandemic.  The respondent stakeholders appear mired in traditional MFM 
thinking.  That is, they are without a consistent, coherent pathway to achieve MFM 
capability at the regional level.  Even though they understand that a local county 
approach in and of itself is not feasible, they are still (magically) counting on the state 
and feds to pull them out. 
The survey reveals respondent confusion in terms of MFM response in general 
(e.g., command and control, coordination, lead agencies at the local and state levels) and 
in specific (e.g., reality of resource flow, futility of isolated single group planning efforts, 
missing parties at the planning table) to the uniqueness of a pandemic incident.  While 
there appears to be agreement on the seriousness and urgency of MFM capabilities in a 
pandemic environment, no one group is ready to step forward and claim leadership or 
even coordination.   
The numerous comments submitted in conjunction with the survey questions 
express a common theme:  “where do we start?”  While it is true that catastrophic surge 
planning may appear a bridge too far at the jurisdictional (local) level without clarity for 
operational guidance at the state or federal guidance, no one group is proposing regional 
operations that extend beyond the usual MOU approach.   
The bottom line of the survey results and data analysis is apparent:  there is a lack 
of consistency and coordination across the key stakeholder groups.  MFM capability in a 
pandemic cannot be achieved in this environment. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY 
The concluding chapter of this thesis presents several approaches to enhance the 
opportunities for building a strong MFM capability at the regional level.  Although the 
recommendations are designed to enable MFM capacity in Ohio, they are also applicable 
to other states and regions.  Given the survey results and the current MFM planning 
mandates from the federal government, it is imperative that MFM planning is 
implemented in a consistent and coordinated way.  Actionable planning that includes 
citizens, businesses, and government representation is an immediate need. 
All sectors of the death care industry must be actively engaged to ensure realistic 
MFM operational planning.  In Ohio, the use of the Non-Acute Mass Fatalities Incident 
Response Plan as well as the national recommendations of the Mass Fatality Working 
Group and a strong international model like that of the UK will provide a bridge to MFM 
operations (OEMA, 2008; Gursky, 2007; Home Office, 2008).  In the end, mass fatality 
capability equates with collaborative capacity, which is defined as “the ability of 
organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of 
collective outcomes (Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, 2006, p. 9).” 
A.   FINAL REVIEW  
1. The MFM Challenge:  Identifying Gaps, Barriers, and Next Steps 
The survey research conducted in Ohio specifically addressed realistic and 
actionable MFM planning by:  1) identifying state guidance gaps; 2) identifying 
local/regional operational gaps; 3) assessing regional resource capabilities; 4) 
categorizing proposed solutions to address identified gaps; and 5) listing legal, financial, 
and organizational barriers to the solutions.  The following research questions guided the 
investigation into statewide MFM during catastrophic surge: 
• What are the current gaps in Ohio’s guidance for fatality management?   
• What are the current gaps in fatality management operational capability at 
the local and regional levels? 
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• What is the current status of fatality management surge resources (e.g., 
staff, stuff [equipment and supplies], systems) at the local and regional 
level?  
• What are the legal, financial, and/or organizational barriers, if any, to 
Ohio’s mass fatality management?  
• How might the information and recommendations gained from this study 
be used in other states and across the nation? 
The data results from the Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophic 
Surge Survey provide the answer to these research questions and also provide a starting 
point for an ongoing MFM regional planning process using public engagement, one of 
the recommendations for actionable planning offered below.   
In addition to the survey results, this thesis provides a thorough review of the 
literature in the area of catastrophic death surge.  While there has been a significant 
amount of writing related to a traditional mass fatality response, published MFM 
literature related to non-scene based death surge from a pandemic remains sparse 
(Connolly, 2006; Fells, 2006; Gerber 2007).  The literature review provides a strong 
foundation for identifying MFM gaps, barriers, and next steps in this country and in its 
diverse communities.   
2. Current MFM Guidance Gaps 
Fatality management is defined as:   
The capability to effectively perform…transportation, storage, 
documentation, and recovery of forensic and physical evidence;  
identification of the fatalities using scientific means; certification of the 
cause and manner of death; processing and returning of human remains 
and personal effects of the victims to the legally authorized person(s); and 
interaction with and provision of legal, customary, compassionate, and 
culturally competent required services to the families of deceased within 
the context of the family assistance center…through a unified command 
structure (DHS, 2007b, p. 571).  
The Public Health and Medical Services Annex, Emergency Support Function 
(ESF) 8, National Response Framework contains no detailed guidance for strategic and 
operational response or recovery for mass-fatality incidents that enter into the 
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catastrophic realm (Gursky, 2007, p. 3; NORTHCOM and HHS, 2006a, p. 2).  The topic 
of death and matters associated with the dignified disposal of tens of thousands of bodies 
remains the “final frontier” for open discussion in the U.S. disaster planning community 
and with policymakers.  Actionable MFM guidance at the national level is lacking. 
The State of Ohio recently released the Acute Mass Fatalities Incident Response 
Plan (OEMA, 2007c), but the guidance was confined to traditional, scene-based, 
DMORT-assisted definition of mass fatalities.  Although there is a key stakeholder 
awareness of the Acute MFM Plan, most survey respondents have not read it and do not 
understand the difference between “acute mass fatalities” and “non-acute mass fatalities.”  
The latter term, used in a second Ohio MFM guidance document soon to be released, will 
provide guidance options for non-scene based mass fatality response.  If the Non-Acute 
Mass Fatalities Incident Response Plan is released in the same manner as its companion, 
there is little doubt that it will fall into the same “non-use” crack.  In addition, there has 
been no concerted effort to include private industry and business in the planning (e.g., 
funeral directors and mortuary providers.)  The citizens-at-large occupy space in this 
same planning gap. 
In Ohio, mass fatality response and recovery is assumed and assigned as a public 
health function under Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8 by the state (OEMA, 2007a).  
Responsibility for leadership and coordination of MFM at the local level, however, is not 
clearly defined or assigned, as confirmed by the survey respondents.  Actionable MFM 
guidance at the state level is lacking.  Furthermore, in the survey results, the key 
stakeholders expressed a vote of non-confidence in their state partners’ ability to address 
such guidance for capable MFM operations realistically.   
3. Current MFM Operational and Resource Gaps 
Ohio key stakeholders do not agree on the lead agency for MFM operations 
command and control or for MFM coordination except in one area:  nobody is overly 
excited about stepping into the MFM leadership void.  The key stakeholders also believe 
that there are needed operational partners missing in the planning process such as funeral 
directors and faith-based community members.  Local officials acknowledge that their 
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counties cannot sustain MFM operations at the jurisdictional level, but no one is working 
on regional collaboration beyond traditional memorandums of understanding (MOU’s) 
for back-up support and resources.  It only stands to reason that neighboring counties will 
also be too overwhelmed with their own death surge demands to free up the needed 
resources to fulfill these pre-existing MOUs in a pandemic environment. 
While MFM planning is sporadically occurring across Ohio’s counties, written 
plans, morgue space, and temporary interment strategies and tactics for the potential level 
of PI death surge have not been addressed.  Neither have the alliances necessary to 
achieve MFM capability been formed.  A megacommunity, defined as “any large 
ongoing sphere of interest where governments, corporations, NGOs, and others intersect 
over time (Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly, 2008, p. 54),” could be such an 
alliance in order to sustain MFM regional operations.  The alliance, of course, would 
need to include all three sectors:  government, industry and business, and citizens.    
Currently, local officials in Ohio are still counting on the cavalry when they think 
about MFM in pandemic surge.  Although they are unsure of which direction the cavalry 
is coming from, they are still confident in its magical protection and powers for response 
and recovery operations.  This unrealistic trust, sans open and honest planning, is 
precisely why MFM operations are vulnerable to breakdown during a long-term 
pandemic.  Key stakeholders are not collaboratively planning with one another in a 
realistic way.  Echoing Reina and Reina’s (2007) work on trust (or breakdown thereof), 
there are government officials at the state level indicating to their locals:  “we have you 
covered.”  In turn, the already overburdened local jurisdictional MFM leads want to 
believe that when the pandemic arrives, the state and federal assets will come through.  
Unfortunately, wishful thinking will not provide MFM capability, and a traditional 
disaster infrastructure delivered in the vertical mode (only) cannot address catastrophic 
surge.  General Gordon R. Sullivan, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, wrote Hope is Not 
a Method (1997) with good reason after years of battling bureaucratic barricades.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Army has been 
reengineered and downsized more thoroughly than any other business. In 
the early 1990s, General Sullivan, army chief of staff, and Colonel Harper, 
his key strategic planner, took the post-Cold War army into the 
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Information Age. Faced with a 40 percent reduction in staff and funding, 
they focused on new peacetime missions, dismantled a cumbersome 
bureaucracy, reinvented procedures, and set the guidelines for achieving a 
vast array of new goals (G. R. Sullivan, 1997). 
4. Current MFM Starting Points and Barriers 
Fortunately, the perceived value of MFM partners already engaged, as well as the 
desire of key stakeholders to start MFM planning, is high. Collaboration and the ability to 
work together through cooperation certainly form a good starting point for state readiness 
in MFM operations.  Fiscal barriers are viewed as the largest perceived hurdle in MFM 
planning as identified by the key stakeholders.  The fiscal barrier is directly related to the 
perceived shortage of resources to accomplish MFM capability, a perception that most 
likely represents traditional thinking about disaster surge and assumes that stuff and staff 
equates with a capable response.  Health commissioners and emergency management 
directors did identify organizational obstacles as the second place barrier.  This response, 
as supported by the written comments, echoes the general survey response themes of:  
“Who’s in charge?  Who’s coordinating the effort?  What’s our role?  Are all of the 
partners at the planning table?  How does my county go to a regional provision without 
state guidance?”  As previously emphasized, a disaster surge response without system 
(infrastructure) ability cannot succeed.  
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Align State Guidance with the Mass Fatality Working Group’s 
Guidance  
State guidance for MFM in catastrophic surge must align with the premiere MFM 
planning guidance to date in the United States, produced by the Mass Fatality Working 
Group, convened in 2006 by the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in 
cooperation with the Department of Health and Human Service (HHS).  The group’s 
MFM guidance is delivered through actionable recommendations to be addressed in 
seven major areas (Gursky, 2007, p. 4):     
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• Command and control 
• Body identification 
• Medico-legal investigation 
• Morgue operations 
• Funeral services 
• Final disposition 
• Family assistance and behavioral health services 
That means, of course, that the issues in each of these areas must be addressed with 
operational detail.  Hard topics like cremation capacity, temporary interment, RFID 
tagging techniques, virtual family assistance centers, and faith based flexibility will need 
to be grappled with among stakeholders and without our societal curtain of death secrecy.     
Ohio’s pending Non-Acute Mass Fatality Incident Response Plan defines non-
acute death as death, which occurs through a situation developing “over an extended time 
period due to disease, biological, chemical, or radiological contamination to include 
pandemics (OEMA, 2008).”  The state’s Non-Acute Plan should align with these seven 
areas, encouraging regional operations to do the same through the clustering of related 
tactical effort at the local level (i.e., counties x and y take on final disposition via 
temporary interment, morgue operations are handled by big city z, etc.).11   
The existing work of the Mass Fatality Working Group should be annotated along 
with Ohio’s Non-Acute Plan, assuring that the questions involved in the group’s national 
MFM gap analysis are clearly identified in the state guidance and discussed in public 
engagement efforts in order to better plan operations at the regional level (NORTHCOM 
and HHS, 2006a, pp. 1, 3; 2006b, pp. 11-12; 2006c, pp. 2-3):  
                                                 
11 By virtue of this study, the author had the opportunity to join the mass fatality planning cell partway 
through the writing of the Non-Acute Plan.  Areas from the Mass Fatality Working Group were 
incorporated into its final draft; the push for regionalization of effort did not arrive due to ongoing legal 
issues surrounding the authority of regional versus county jurisdiction within the Ohio Revised Code. 
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a. Questions Related to Authority/Policy and Procedures 
How might fatality management lines of authority and relevant policies 
and procedures be established at the national and state levels in order to provide a 
template or guide for local planning?  What elements within this guidance are critical for 
field expedient identification and disposition of pandemic influenza victims in a nation of 
varied cultures, religious backgrounds, socio-economics and values?  Since 
communication and clear lines of authority during all stages of the pandemic are essential 
to successful MFM planning and operations, how can relevant stakeholders be identified 
and included in the development of pre-event pandemic education plan for emergency 
center operations personnel and the public? 
b. Questions Related to Already Developed Pandemic Influenza 
Planning 
How should currently mandated state pandemic influenza plans be adapted 
and/or modified to ensure realistic mass fatality management at the local level?  Who 
should be involved in coordinating and leading this effort?  Given that it is the current 
capacity of local funeral and mortuary services operations that will ultimately be 
overwhelmed, how will protocol be defined for handling, processing, safe keeping, and 
disposition of large numbers of remains in a respectful and dignified manner? 
c. Questions Related to Private versus Public Responsibilities and 
Roles 
How does a professional body of practice (i.e., the death care industry) 
develop a non-traditional first responder mindset in order to deliver field expedient 
mortuary services in disaster surge?  Why are funeral service personnel, suppliers and 
other mortuary service operations not routinely included in disaster planning for a PI 
surge that will result in hundreds and thousands of bodies to identify and humanely 
dispose of?  How do the local level responders prepare for this role without a promise of 
state or federal assistance?  The ability to respond effectively to a pandemic event 
depends on the availability of critical resources (e.g., vaccine, fuel, utilities, labor, raw 
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materials, transportation, security, communication bandwidth, etc.) as well as the surge 
competencies of the professional group utilizing the resources (e.g., public education 
messages, pre-established partnerships, incident management knowledge). How might 
state PI plans be developed, adapted and/or modified to address resource, logistics, and 
funding concerns down to assurance of local capacity?  
d. Questions Related to Family Assistance Efforts 
How might a virtual Family Assistance Center (FAC) be established in a 
communicable infectious disease environment using the internet, newspapers and 
television to disburse educational information to the public?  How might a national 
database for missing persons be set up to address the concerns related to relatives and 
others who are unaccounted for?  Given the contagious nature of PI and given that the 
gathering and milling about of people at the FAC will be not be feasible during social 
distancing, how will FACs operate?  Since death surge related to PI will be chronic rather 
than static (acute and scene-based), how will waves of deaths over a period of several 
weeks and involving multiple family members at different times, affect needed 
distribution of information?  How can the needed information be pushed rather than 
pulled (i.e., needing to bring people in) to obtain information about potential fatalities?  
Since local jurisdictions will be overwhelmed with response, how will the federal level of 
government coordinate and manage a nationwide need for information regarding missing 
persons in a highly mobile and family-separated society? 
It is only when these questions are addressed that actionable operations for 
MFM capability will be developed at the regional level.  There are operational and 
tactical MFM options available to address these questions; the harder issue involves 
engaging the population in value-laden decisions as to which solution fits best in their 
community.  The guidance should encourage and address the latter; much like the U.K.’s 
MFM planning has accomplished (Home Office, 2008). 
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2. Ensure Alliances that Promote the Megacommunity  
Mass fatality management in catastrophic surge is a problem that cannot be solved 
by single sectors, be they government, business, or citizens.  A mass fatality incident due 
to PI would create a chaotic environment almost immediately after recognized arrival in 
the United States.  In addition, the death surge would stretch far beyond a three-day, 72-
hour period.  MFM in PI is a large-scale, complex undertaking; mutual effort for a three-
sector “megacommunity” engagement is a must.  It should be increasingly apparent after 
several national disasters that “local communities are neither constrained nor protected by 
age-old boundaries of geography and demography (Gerencser et al., 2007, p. 2).”  In 
Florida, for example, leaders recognized that no single organization could effectively 
meet the demands of hurricane preparedness and subsequent response.  They came to this 
conclusion after a less than successful response to and recovery from Hurricane Andrew.  
Afterwards, Florida officials engaged the megacommunity, to include a wide range of 
non-profit groups and businesses, in future hurricane preparedness efforts with 
subsequent operational success (Gerencser, 2007, pp. 25-27). 
The megacommunity (Figure 6) depicts alliances where members use join efforts 
for leverage in order to accomplish the mission without giving up organizational and 
agency authority.  Importantly, all of the players are aware and knowledgeable about 
what death surge would require of each sector.  Also, to date, funeral directors, mental 
health, hospitals, faith-based representatives and citizens-at-large have been left behind in 
addressing MFM due to a bevy of societal mores and governmental concerns.  In order to 
be disaster ready, our communities cannot afford such omissions.   
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Figure 6.   Megacommunity Thinking (From: Gerencser et al., 2007) 
3. Engage the Public in Open Talk about a Forbidden Topic 
The public engagement model recommended for MFM planning in Ohio follows 
the model and process template developed by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) Public Engagement Project on Community Control Measures for 
Pandemic Influenza (The Keystone Center, 2007).  The project engaged the public in 
discussions and deliberations about the economic and social tradeoffs associated with 
community control measures (non-pharmaceutical) to slow pandemic influenza disease 
spread.  The MFM public engagement project is slated for implementation in two pilot 
homeland security (HLS) regions during the fall and winter of 2008-2009.12  
The pilot project’s goal is to build the MFM capacity at the regional level in Ohio 
in two regions: Southeast HLS Region 1 (Ross, Pike, Hocking, Vinton, and Jackson 
                                                 
12 The pilot project is funded through CDC and the Ohio Department of Health pandemic influenza 
cooperative agreement dollars.  The public engagement process will be coordinated and facilitated by The 
Ohio State University (OSU) Office of Workforce Development (OWD) and its Ohio Center for Public 
Health Preparedness, located in OSU’s College of Public Health. 
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Counties) with a population of 175,000 and the Northwest HLS Region (Six Pact – 
Williams, Henry, Fulton, Paulding, Putnam, and Defiance Counties) with a population 
200,000.  The identified counties in these two HLS regions will participate in a 
discussion of policy decisions related to MFM in pandemic influenza.  The OWD will 
work collaboratively with the identified alliances in both geographic areas to accomplish 
planning for MFM capability.   
The public engagement model will be used to connect megacommunity members 
for MFM policy discussion and deliberation, integrating the social network analysis 
results described in the regional recommendation section.  Results from the three surveys 
will also be used:  Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge:  County 
Coroners; Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge:  County 
Emergency Managers; and Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge: 
City and County Health Commissioners (Appendices A and B.)  The public engagement 
model will provide the vision, sense of contribution, full engagement, sense of progress, 
and goal coherence needed to jump start regional MFM capability (Cross and Parker, 
2004, pp. 57-63).  The public engagement forums for MFM include one day of discussion 
and deliberation devoted to business and government and one day to the citizen group.  
The project will: 
• Inform and assist state and local level decision-makers involved in 
pending, values-oriented policy decisions related to MFM in pandemic 
influenza planning 
• Evaluate the effectiveness of engaging both citizens-at-large and other 
stakeholders in public health policy decisions surrounding MFM 
• Increase state and local capacity to engage the public on policy choices in 
MFM effectively 
• Empower citizens to participate effectively in public decision-making 
work regarding MFM 
• Achieve results that enhance public trust in public health decisions 
regarding policy choices in MFM 
There will be cross-over representation for both groups (e.g., some citizens will 
be present at the business and government meeting and vice-versa.)  Each day will begin 
with a short education and training session on the realities of MFM in pandemic 
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influenza.  Focus sessions follow which will engage the megacommunity in deliberations 
about MFM measures that might be implemented in the event of overwhelming death 
surge related to pandemic influenza.  After small group and large group discussions, the 
stakeholders and citizens will be invited to vote electronically on a series of questions 
designed to evaluate their level of support for the proposed MFM measures.   
All small and large group sessions will be recorded and transcribed by objective, 
trained observers.  Themes will be identified by multiple raters using qualitative data 
analysis.  An independent evaluation will include four possible components: a pre-post 
survey completed by citizens and stakeholders (which will produce additional 
quantitative data beyond the previous statewide survey intervention), qualitative data on 
deliberations and prioritized decisions gathered during the day-long sessions for both 
citizens and stakeholders, focus groups conducted with citizens immediately after each 
meeting, and a document review to assess how the public engagement process influenced 
policy.  
Once the pilot project is evaluated per the cooperative agreement plans, the 
formal process will be ready for statewide distribution and implementation.  The release 
of this public engagement process, of course, extends well beyond the specific topic of 
MFM planning for regional capacity in pandemic surge.  The process could be 
generalized for other disaster planning topics and certainly used across Ohio’s state 
boundaries.  Ultimately, the project could assist states to: 
• Publicly identify of major categories of challenges associated with the 
implementation of proposed mass fatality planning 
• Build internal and external trust among the megacommunity members 
who participate, enhancing true partnerships and community resiliency 
• Replicate the MFM public engagement project as a pending decision 




4. Promote Regional Response and Recovery without Reinventing the 
Wheel 
The traditional verticality of the local-state-federal levels of disaster paradigm is 
firmly etched in the nation’s pre-2005 planning documents, as well as its resulting 
emergency planning and response infrastructure (DHS, 2008b, pp. 1-11).  Yet, 
community capability in public health surge in catastrophic incidents demands a regional 
response as the minimum level of initial coordination (Inglesby, 2006).  “Comprehensive 
regional preparedness is key to ensuring that communities, states, and the nation can 
expeditiously respond to and recover from disasters of all types, particularly extreme 
events (TISP, 2006, p. 3).” 
Project Public Health Ready (PPHR), a project of the National Association of 
City and County Health Departments (NACCHO) and the CDC, recently published a 
planning guide to address regional planning development.  The three-phase, 11-step plan 
lays out a template for the creation of a regional approach to achieve capability in terms 
of prevention, protection, response and recovery (Estrada, Lenihan, Shiu, Sutton, and 
Welter, 2007, p. 12).  It also provides descriptions and examples of different 
collaboration models to include networking, coordinating, standardizing, and 
centralizing.  This model should be used to start the process of regional response 
capabilities.   
As a part of the previously described public engagement effort, a network analysis 
specific to MFM infrastructure and involving government, business, and citizen should 
be conducted.   
Complex issues naturally draw people into networks.  As a result, the 
structure of a megacommunity — based as it is on overlapping issues — 
exhibits many properties of a network. … In a healthy megacommunity, 
the three sectors maintain balance by “pushing” and “pulling” at each 
other according to their respective forms of influence.  (Gerencser et al., 
2007, p. 55). 
The existing MFM network at the regional level must be identified in order to 
garner support for MFM effort in operational planning, response, and recovery.  
Although the Regional Mass Fatality Management in Catastrophe Surge Survey results 
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provide a snapshot on the state of MFM, it is limited to the three stakeholder respondent 
groups and not representative of the larger (mega) community.  Answers to the following 
questions should be included in the network identification in the pilot public engagement 
forums (Gerencser et. al., 2007, p. 119): 
• What are the major drivers for MFM societal values, impact, and cost? 
• Which members of the megacommunity does MFM capability depend on 
(i.e., what is the extended enterprise)?  Have they been included? 
• What are the strategic risks of regional MFM organization for response 
and recovery? 
• What global (statewide and national) issues will have a direct and material 
impact on MFM capabilities in the region?  How about an indirect impact? 
• What issues is the megacommunity concerned about regarding MFM 
response and recovery to include:  partners, resource suppliers, lead 
agents, and legal code?  
In order for MFM to go from local to regional variations, the following would 
need to occur (Estrada et al., 2007, p. 6): 
• The development of a common vision in order to reduce the daunting 
initial complexity (using the Mass Fatality Working Group’s approach 
previously addressed) 
• The development of a planning process using PPHR’s planning 
framework template 
• An analysis of possible outcomes and obstacles that can be expected in the 
development of regional readiness and use of a Public Engagement 
Process 
5. Considerations for Implementation of Recommendations 
A new national survey reveals that a startling number of small businesses remain 
unprepared to face a potential disaster, be that a hurricane, tornado, wildfire or computer 
virus, and the majority of these businesses have no plans to change (CPM Global 
Assurance, 2008).  At the same time, the nation’s homeland security and health 




contributions and capabilities in disaster planning (Schoch-Spana et al., 2007, p. 8).  The 
public engagement activities recommended for implementation at the regional level 
provide one way to chip away at this involvement dilemma.   
An individual who is an advocate-champion will be required for reality-based 
MFM planning and to bridge operational conversion of the community at large.  One 
very important part of the publicly engaged network, though, would be to keep the key 
stakeholders and government officials at the local jurisdiction levels from hindering the 
process with “we do it this way because I (my agency) knows best” ideas for MFM 
response and recovery.  If true inclusion of citizens, business, and government is to be 
accomplished, then oversight and protection against “expert” and authoritative edicts is a 
must.  Although the latter may well abound, the planning must be addressed with non-
traditional voices to succeed in a non-traditional environment of chaos.  Also, catalysts at 
the regional level must be quickly identified to drive and sustain those non-traditional 
inputs and assure a true megacommunity effort during the public engagement period and 
beyond.  There is one local county coroner, for example, currently in Northwest HLS 
Region in Ohio, who has been responsible for galvanizing stakeholders around the 
concept of regional mass fatality planning for a surge event like PI.  This group, in turn, 
is busy gathering others into the fold.  This effort occurred prior to any operational 
guidance or mandates from the state level and certainly without any concrete leadership 
at the national level.  Since one of the first pilots for public engagement effort will take 
place in this region, this scenario will provide an opportunity to take a closer look at just 
how champions and catalysts affect the disaster planning community.  
Successful MFM planning requires expeditious action by entire communities.  
Decisions and policies need to be informed by factual information and by thoughtful 
weight of competing societal values. Somebody is going to have to lead the discussion 
about the probability of death in a catastrophic incident like pandemic influenza, 
regardless of the best laid plans for life-safety response efforts.  The sheer magnitude of 
such a death surge in light of the initial non-availability of vaccine as well as the use of 
early treatment versus prophylactic antivirals must be honestly broached in terms of  
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public education.  There is also a need for open discussion about dealing with death and 
body care in the home, something that most of the U.S. society has avoided exposure to 
for over 75 years.   
Figure 7 presents a summary look at achieving the implementation of the MFM 
recommendations is through an action framework that takes advantage of driving forces 
for change (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005, p. 35; Swinton, n.d.).  The driving forces are 
found in the categories of “eliminate, reduce, raise, and create.”  Restraining forces are 
implied in the “eliminate” and “reduce” categories and involve a local (county) mindset 
that belies the reality of catastrophic surge, leading to duplication without an economy of 
scale effort (regional).  If the aforementioned champions and catalysts in the change 
process can take advantage of and sustain these driving forces, then a workable and 
realistic MFM capability will be achieved.   
 
Eliminate 
• MFM as a competitive commodity 
• Wasted energy and resources in 
duplication (coffins, PPE, burial sites)  
• Local competition for MFM sourcing 
• Unrealistic paper planning 
Raise 
• MFM capability 
• Mission unity  
• Key stakeholder coordination 
• Megacommunity MFM awareness 
• COMMUNITY preparedness 
Reduce 
• Death care industry and system seams 
• Bickering at the county level 
• Cost (fiscal barriers) 
• Public apathy from non-involvement 
Create 
• Public health as ESF #8 MFM lead 
• Surge capability 
• Family assistance and support 
• MFM guidance at the state level 
• MFM operations at the county level 
• A REGIONAL disaster planning 
model 
Figure 7.   Recommendations’ Goal for Success in MFM – Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-
Create Grid (After: Kim and Mauborgne, 2005, p. 95) 
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6. Future Research Recommendations   
The literature review revealed the lack of continuity in planning as well as the 
lack of realistic planning that currently exists in state pandemic influenza plans and other 
planning documents.  This thesis has presented one planning topic germane to a non-
geographically based catastrophic disaster:  mass fatality management in pandemic surge.  
The recommendations made in this thesis include the use of sound national guidance 
specific to a disaster topic, public engagement at the megacommunity level with balanced 
citizen, government, and business membership, and a regional versus local (horizontal 
versus vertical) disaster response approach.  Any of these recommendations would 
provide a pathway for a more in-depth research approach specific to mass fatality 
management or another aspect of catastrophic disaster such as pandemic surge.  Such 
research should move beyond the traditional views of emergency management and reach 
out to assure true community involvement in the process:  before, during, and after the 
chaos that would accompany such an incident.    
C.  SUMMARY   
This thesis has proposed a suite of actionable recommendations for regional mass 
fatality management planning in the State of Ohio.  The recommendations also have 
applicability for MFM response and recovery plans beyond Ohio’s borders.  Mass fatality 
management planning, like all disaster planning, demands shared multidisciplinary and 
multiagency participation as well as private industry, business, and public input.  Active 
collaboration among all mass fatality management stakeholders must be achieved in 
order to develop actionable MFM at the regional level.   
While it may be true that all disaster response is “local” within the national 
disaster planning framework, recent incidents have clearly demonstrated that certain 
types of disasters quickly reach a catastrophic threshold, almost immediately exhausting 
local resources for sustainment due to surge response demand and the ensuing recovery 
period.  Pandemic influenza would create such a pandemic surge, circling the globe and 
our nation in several waves with resulting mortality surges.  This type of surge demands 
local catastrophic capabilities to include a regional response level as the minimum level 
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of initial coordination.  In higher level disaster (i.e., catastrophe), local jurisdictions 
would need to move almost immediately into multi-effort, collaborative, horizontal 
operations to sustain response and recovery.   
The very topic of death surge demands weighing competing societal values along 
with its reality-based technical knowledge and information.  It is absolutely essential that 
the public and private death infrastructure become a part of the MFM policy decisions in 
order to energize trust between authorities and the public pre-incident.  To date, public 
and stakeholder engagement in pre-event PI planning for value-laden decisions is a 
necessary yet missing part of national and state planning.  It is past time for a change.   
Regions need to build capability for sustained resiliency and operational reality 
into disaster planning efforts posthaste.  This must happen without the usual drill: paper 
the process, shelve it, and respond with a best intended effort, all the while counting on 
outside resources when the situation soars and then sours.  This traditional type of MFM 
is exactly the response currently written into most current planning for Pandemic 
Influenza (PI).  Responders to an incident that is simultaneously affecting numerous 
communities and many states (i.e., a non-scene based incident) cannot waste time and 
effort by counting on outside resources, state or federal, that will be required and 
competed for nationwide. There will be no nationally supported safety net in such 
circumstances.  Communities must look to their own stakeholders and citizens to find 
realistic ways of augmenting and expanding their PI plans in order to ensure 
sustainability.   
As this chapter closes, the U.K. has moved ahead in the release of MFM planning 
and realities, with London just promoting a citizen-at-large version of the MFM plan in 
order to further local resiliency efforts (London Resilience Partnership, 2008).  In the 
U.S., though, public health planners are still worried about quarantine, antiviral policies, 
and resource supply chains in PI, with several local and state level entities railing against 
current federal guidance (Kimery, 2008).  Driven by the Joint Commission’s Hospital 
Accreditation Organization’s Standards (JCHAO’s) EC 4.18.5, hospitals are racing to 
create their own mass fatality plans, with Los Angeles just releasing what will 
undoubtedly become another planning template (Los Angeles County, 2008).  This most 
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recent plan puts the coroner in the lead agency status, but alludes to the fact that public 
health may also be in the lead, advising hospitals to stay tuned for breaking information.  
There is still no formal national guidance and the state of the MFM art in catastrophic 
surge is not much advanced, perpetually taking a back seat to all of the other disaster 
planning demands, which involve the living.   
The time is right and the need is still critical in terms of MFM planning in this 
nation.  If the nation, states, regions, and local entities do not acknowledge the need for a 
different type of approach for a non-scene based mass fatality response, this country will 
remain unprepared — without the operational capability to address catastrophic mass 
fatalities related to a widespread and communicable disease like PI realistically. 
The actionable MFM recommendations contained in this research enable the local 
players responsible for catastrophic mass fatality to operate consistently at a regional 
level, engaging their stakeholders and communities and asking for, then using state and 
national guidance.  Catastrophic MFM planning has the potential to assure other state 
capabilities.  Ultimately, this national homeland security dilemma is about an incident 
with the negative ability to deter the public’s confidence in their government during 
disaster, possibly impacting other response and recovery efforts.  This nation and its 
disaster assets possess the ability to face value laden decisions like MFM with the wealth 
of collaborative energy and reality of specialized technical expertise that the deceased 
and their families will demand in a catastrophic mass fatality incident.  Somebody just 
needs to lead the way.   
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APPENDIX A.  SURVEY DOCUMENTS OR DOCUMENTS 
RELATED TO THE SURVEY 









































D. REGIONAL MFM IN CATASTROPHE SURGE-COMBINED DOCUMENT 
TOPICS for 
COVERAGE 
COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
INTRO SECTION Results of the survey will be released 
through group analysis and report, down 
to the homeland security regional level 
(only). Your participation is completely 
voluntary and you may stop the survey at 
any time.  The survey is designed to take 
about 30 minutes to complete.   
 
This Mass Fatality Management survey 
has been sent to all county coroners in 
Ohio, in addition to county emergency 
management directors and city/county 
health commissioners. It was reviewed at 
the executive leadership level by the Ohio 
State Coroner’s Association prior to its 
release. The survey’s purpose is to 
explore the current state of Mass Fatality 
Management (MFM) in Ohio to include 
the identification of knowledge of existing 
guidance, jurisdictional confidence in 
planning, identification of partners, and 
possible barriers to fatality management 
operational capability at the local and 
regional levels.  Most importantly, it will 
assist in providing a baseline for the 
development of actionable regional 
planning for catastrophic levels of 
fatalities (e.g., during Pandemic 
Influenza).   
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(only). Your participation is completely 
voluntary and you may stop the survey at 
any time.  The survey is designed to take 
about 30 minutes to complete.   
 
This Mass Fatality Management survey 
has been sent to all county emergency 
management directors in Ohio, in 
addition to county coroners and city/ 
county health commissioners. It was 
reviewed at the executive leadership level 
by the Ohio Emergency Management 
Association prior to its release. The 
survey’s purpose is to explore the current 
state of Mass Fatality Management 
(MFM) in Ohio to include the 
identification of knowledge of existing 
guidance, jurisdictional confidence in 
planning, identification of partners, and 
possible barriers to fatality management 
operational capability at the local and 
regional levels.  Most importantly, it will 
assist in providing a baseline for the 
development of actionable regional 
planning for catastrophic levels of 
fatalities (e.g., during Pandemic 
Influenza).   
 
Results of the survey will be released 
through group analysis and report, 
down to the homeland security regional 
level (only). Your participation is 
completely voluntary and you may stop 
the survey at any time.  The survey is 
designed to take about 30 minutes to 
complete.   
 
This Mass Fatality Management survey 
has been sent to all city/county health 
commissioners in Ohio, as well as all 
county coroners and county emergency 
management directors. It was reviewed at 
the executive leadership level by the 
Association of Ohio Health 
Commissioners prior to its release. The 
survey’s purpose is to explore the current 
state of Mass Fatality Management 
(MFM) in Ohio to include the 
identification of knowledge of existing 
guidance, jurisdictional confidence in 
planning, identification of partners, and 
possible barriers to fatality management 
operational capability at the local and 
regional levels.  Most importantly, it will 
assist in providing a baseline for the 
development of actionable regional  
planning for catastrophic levels of 
fatalities (e.g., during Pandemic 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
An influenza pandemic will result in 
waves of mass fatalities sustained over 
extended periods of time without 
geographic concentration (e.g., non-
scene based.) Given the enormous and 
concurrent need for resources over wide 
geographic areas combined with staffing 
shortages of essential service employees, 
mass fatality planning for Pandemic 
Influenza is unlike any prior disaster 
planning endeavor.  “A pandemic is not 
like a hurricane or an earthquake, 
where resources and help can be shifted 
from one area to another. Should it 
occur, every community will need to rely 
on its own planning and its own 
resources as it fights the outbreak.” – 
DHHS Secretary Michael Leavitt, 2006 
 
 Based on CDC FluAid 2.0 software 
calculations using a 35% attack rate and 
Ohio 2005 population estimates, a mild 
case Pandemic Influenza scenario (1968 
occurrence) could produce up to an 
additional 10,666 deaths and a worst 
case scenario (1918-like occurrence) up 
to an additional 87,661 deaths.   
 
 
An influenza pandemic will result in 
waves of mass fatalities sustained over 
extended periods of time without 
geographic concentration (e.g., non-
scene based.) Given the enormous and 
concurrent need for resources over wide 
geographic areas combined with staffing 
shortages of essential service employees, 
mass fatality planning for Pandemic 
Influenza is unlike any prior disaster 
planning endeavor.  “A pandemic is not 
like a hurricane or an earthquake, 
where resources and help can be shifted 
from one area to another. Should it 
occur, every community will need to rely 
on its own planning and its own 
resources as it fights the outbreak.” – 
DHHS Secretary Michael Leavitt, 2006 
 
Based on CDC FluAid 2.0 software 
calculations using a 35% attack rate and 
Ohio 2005 population estimates, a mild 
case Pandemic Influenza scenario (1968 
occurrence) could produce up to an 
additional 10,666 deaths and a worst 
case scenario (1918-like occurrence) up 




An influenza pandemic will result in 
waves of mass fatalities sustained over 
extended periods of time without 
geographic concentration (e.g., non-
scene based.) Given the enormous and 
concurrent need for resources over wide 
geographic areas combined with staffing 
shortages of essential service employees, 
mass fatality planning for PI is unlike any 
prior disaster planning endeavor.  “A 
pandemic is not like a hurricane or an 
earthquake, where resources and help 
can be shifted from one area to another. 
Should it occur, every community will 
need to rely on its own planning and its 
own resources as it fights the outbreak.” 
– DHHS Secretary Michael Leavitt, 
2006 
 
Based on CDC FluAid 2.0 software 
calculations using a 35% attack rate and 
Ohio 2005 population estimates, a mild 
case Pandemic Influenza scenario (1968 
occurrence) could produce up to an 
additional 10,666 deaths and a worst 
case scenario (1918-like occurrence) up 
to an additional 87,661 deaths 
What is Mass 
Fatality? 
Note:  Fatality Management is a Target 
Capability within the National 
Preparedness Guidelines (USDHS, 
Target Capabilities List, September 
2007). Fatality Management is defined 
as:  “The capability to effectively perform 
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COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
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scene documentation; the complete 
collection and recovery of the dead, 
victim’s personal effects, and items of 
evidence; transportation, storage, 
documentation, and recovery of forensic 
and physical evidence;  identification of 
the fatalities using scientific means; 
certification of the cause and manner of 
death; processing and returning of 
human remains and personal effects of 
the victims to the legally authorized 
person(s); and interaction with and 
provision of legal, customary, 
compassionate, and culturally competent 
required services to the families of 
deceased within the context of the family 
assistance center.” p. 519  
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I am the lead agent for 
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2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
I am the lead agent for 
coordination of Mass Fatality 
Management (MFM) in my 
jurisdiction. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
I am the lead agent for 
coordination of Mass Fatality 
Management (MFM) in my 
jurisdiction. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 





My agency has entered into 
Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOUs) within our Homeland 
Security Region (HLS Region) or 
is counting on 
My agency has entered into 
Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOUs) within our Homeland 
Security Region (HLS Region) or 
is counting on 
My agency has entered into 
Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOUs) within our Homeland 
Security Region (HLS Region) or 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
neighboring/regional help during 
MFM related to Pandemic 
Influenza (PI). 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
neighboring/regional help during 
MFM related to Pandemic 
Influenza (PI). 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
neighboring/regional help during 
MFM related to Pandemic 
Influenza (PI). 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 







Although MFM operations occur 
at the local level, my jurisdiction is 
a part of planning and response at 
the Regional HLS level.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
Although MFM operations occur 
at the local level, my jurisdiction is 
a part of planning and response at 
the Regional HLS level.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
Although MFM operations occur 
at the local level, my jurisdiction 
is a part of l planning and response 
at the Regional HLS level.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
    
What Does Unified 
Command in Mass 
Fatality Look Like 
at the Local Level? 





The following partners should be 
involved in Mass Fatality 
Management (MFM) within my 
jurisdiction: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
The following partners should be 
involved in Mass Fatality 
Management (MFM) within my 
jurisdiction: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
The following partners should be 
involved in Mass Fatality 
Management (MFM) within my 
jurisdiction: 
1.  Health department 





COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list all) 
 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list all) 
 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  






Note:  Actual jurisdictional 
partnering involves meetings 
within the last year or published 
joint planning documents or 
annexes specific to MFM.   
The following partners are 
involved in MFM within my 
jurisdiction: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list all) 
 
Note:  Actual jurisdictional 
partnering involves meetings 
within the last year or published 
joint planning documents or 
annexes specific to MFM.   
The following partners are 
involved in MFM within my 
jurisdiction: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list all) 
 
Note:  Actual jurisdictional 
partnering involves meetings 
within the last year or published 
joint planning documents or 
annexes specific to MFM.   
The following partners are 
involved in MFM within my 
jurisdiction: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list all) 
 




The lead agent for the command 
and control of MFM during an 
incident affecting my jurisdiction 
is the: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
The lead agent for command and 
control of MFM during an incident 
affecting my jurisdiction is the: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
The lead agent for command and 
control of MFM during an incident 
affecting my jurisdiction is the: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Unified Command with 
multiple leads 
6.  Other (please list) 
 
5.  Unified Command with 
multiple leads 
6.  Other (please list) 
 
5.  Unified Command with 
multiple leads 






The lead agent for MFM 
coordination in my jurisdiction is 
the: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list) 
 
The lead agent for MFM 
coordination in my jurisdiction is 
the: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list) 
 
The lead agent for MFM 
coordination in my jurisdiction is 
the: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  




Question 8  
 
I am confident that I can work 
with my jurisdictional partners to 
accomplish MFM planning, 
response, and recovery.  
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
I am confident that I can work 
with my jurisdictional partners to 
accomplish MFM planning, 
response, and recovery. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
I am confident that I can work 
with my jurisdictional partners to 
accomplish MFM planning, 
response, and recovery. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 




Mass fatalities related to Pandemic 
Influenza (PI) should  be 
considered coroner’s cases.  
Mass fatalities related to Pandemic 
Influenza (PI) should be 
considered coroner’s cases.  
Mass fatalities related to Pandemic 
Influenza (PI) should be 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree  
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 




Guidance for Mass 
Fatality 
Management Look 
Like at the State 
Level? 
 
   





I have read or have access to 
Ohio’s Acute Mass Fatalities 
Incident Response Plan released in 
May 2007 (Tab D to Emergency 
Support Function #8 Public Health 
and Medical Services). 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
I have read or have access to 
Ohio’s Acute Mass Fatalities 
Incident Response Plan released in 
May 2007 (Tab D to Emergency 
Support Function #8 Public Health 
and Medical Services). 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
I have read or have access to 
Ohio’s Acute Mass Fatalities 
Incident Response Plan released in 
May 2007 (Tab D to Emergency 
Support Function #8 Public Health 
and Medical Services). 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 













COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 




I am confident that Ohio’s Acute 
Mass Fatalities Incident Response 
Plan can guide my jurisdiction’s 
response to MFM in Pandemic 
Influenza. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
I am confident that Ohio’s Acute 
Mass Fatalities Incident Response 
Plan can guide my jurisdiction’s 
response to MFM in Pandemic 
Influenza. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
I am confident that Ohio’s Acute 
Mass Fatalities Incident Response 
Plan can guide my jurisdiction’s 
response to MFM in Pandemic 
Influenza. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 





The lead agent for MFM 
coordination at the state level is 
the: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list) 
The lead agent for MFM 
coordination at the state level is 
the: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list) 
 
The lead agent for MFM 
coordination at the state level is 
the: 
1.  Health department 
2.  Emergency management 
agency 
3.  Funeral directors 
4.  County coroner 
5.  Mental health  
6.  Other (please list) 
Relationships 
 
Question 13  
 
I am confident that the state 
partners can work together to 
accomplish needed guidance for 
MFM planning, response, and 
recovery.  
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
I am confident that the state 
partners can work together to 
accomplish needed guidance for 
MFMplanning, response, and 
recovery.  
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
I am confident that the state 
partners can work together to 
accomplish needed guidance for 
MFM planning, response, and 
recovery.  
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
4. Agree 





I am confident that Ohio can bring 
regional and state consistency to 
MFM through the planning 
process. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
I am confident that Ohio can bring 
regional and state consistency to 
MFM through the planning 
process. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
  
 
I am confident that Ohio can bring 
regional and state consistency to 
MFM through the planning 
process. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 




   
 
Question 15 
The funeral industry in my 
jurisdiction has access to (BREAK 
OUT EACH OF THE 
FOLLOWING ITEMS FOR 
SEPARATE RESPONSE) [labor, 
supplies, personal protective 
equipment, vaccines, fuel, raw 
materials, communication 
bandwidth, transportation, and 
security and other resources] to 
become a first responder in an 
My agency is prepared to assist the 
funeral industry in my jurisdiction 
obtain access to (BREAK OUT 
EACH OF THE FOLLOWING 
ITEMS FOR SEPARATE 
RESPONSE) [labor, supplies, 
personal protective equipment, 
vaccines, fuel, raw materials, 
communication bandwidth, 
transportation, and security and 
other resources] to become a first 
My agency is prepared to assist the 
funeral industry in my jurisdiction 
obtain access to (BREAK OUT 
EACH OF THE FOLLOWING 
ITEMS FOR SEPARATE 
RESPONSE) [labor, supplies, 
personal protective equipment, 
vaccines, fuel, raw materials, 
communication bandwidth, 
transportation, and security and 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
responder in an MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
responder in an MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
Question  
16.  My jurisdiction has pre-
identified community-based 
collection points and morgues that 
meet temperature requirements.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 





17.  My jurisdiction has organized 
and trained volunteers from the 
community to assist with and 
support MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
16.  My jurisdiction has organized 
and trained volunteers from the 
community to assist with and 
support MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
16.  My jurisdiction has organized 
and trained volunteers from the 
community to assist with and 
support MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
Question  
 
18.  My jurisdiction has 
established simple, uniform 
procedures to request critical 
assistance from the state to 
expedite obtaining people, 
17.  My jurisdiction has 
established simple, uniform 
procedures to request critical 
assistance from the state to 
expedite obtaining people, 
17.  My jurisdiction has 
established simple, uniform 
procedures to request critical 
assistance from the state to 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
supplies, equipment, and/or 
operational assistance.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
supplies, equipment, and/or 
operational assistance.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
supplies, equipment, and/or 
operational assistance.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
Question 
19.  I am confident that my office 
can facilitate and provide 
oversight assurance in mass 
fatality to pronounce death, 
determine the cause and manner of 
death, complete death certificates, 
and establish victim identity. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 18.  I am confident that my agency 
can complete death certificates and 
accompanying burial/provisional 
or cremation permits through the 
Electronic Death Registration 
System in mass fatality. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
Question  
20.  I am confident that my 
jurisdiction has viable plans to 
augment existing morgue space for 
an extended time period.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
18.  I am confident that my 
jurisdiction has viable plans to 
augment existing morgue space for 
an extended time period.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 





COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 




21.  My office has a stockpile of 
critical supplies to support MFM 
operations for 10 days. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
19.  My jurisdiction has access to a 
stockpile of critical supplies to 
support MFM operations for 10 
days. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 




22.  My office has agreements in 
place to ensure that MFM 
operations are supported by 
priority distribution of water, 
generators, and gasoline. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
20.  My jurisdiction has 
agreements in place to ensure that 
MFM operations are supported by 
a priority distribution of water, 
generators, and gasoline. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 





 21.  My jurisdiction has explored 
strategies to augment 
transportation of human remains 
during MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 





COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 





 22.  My jurisdiction’s Citizen’s 
Corps is a viable source of 
volunteers for MFM .  
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree  
 
19.  My jurisdiction’s Citizen’s 
Corps is a viable source of 
volunteers for MFM .  
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 




 23.  My jurisdiction’s Medical 
Reserve Corps is a viable source to 
expand subject matter expertise 
and bolster MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
20.  My jurisdiction’s Medical 
Reserve Corps is a viable source to 
expand subject matter expertise 
and bolster MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
    
 
 











23.  My jurisdiction has addressed 
the expected surge in morgue and 
funeral capacity by defining 
standard protocols for handling, 
processing securing, and disposing 
24.  My jurisdiction has addressed 
the expected surge in morgue and 
funeral capacity by defining 
standard protocols for handling, 
processing securing, and disposing 
21.  My jurisdiction has addressed 
the expected surge in morgue and 
funeral capacity by defining 
standard protocols for handling, 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
of large numbers of remains in a 
respectful and dignified manner. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
of large numbers of remains in a 
respectful and dignified manner. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
of large numbers of remains in a 
respectful and dignified manner. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
The note is inserted to 
validate that mass 
burials and 
cremations are “on 




Note:  Ohio Revised Code Sec 
4717.13 dictates identification 
methods (e.g., tags and data) to be 
used in carrying out mass burials 
and cremations.   
24.  My jurisdiction has pre-
identified possible mass burial 
sites (temporary) or cremation 
arrangements.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
Note:  Ohio Revised Code Sec 
4717.13 dictates identification 
methods (e.g., tags and data) to be 
used in carrying out mass burials 
and cremations.   
25.  My jurisdiction has pre-
identified possible mass burial 
sites (temporary) or cremation 
arrangements.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
Note:  Ohio Revised Code Sec 
4717.13 dictates identification 
methods (e.g., tags and data) to be 
used in carrying out mass burials 
and cremations.   
22. My jurisdiction has pre-
identified possible mass burial 
sites (temporary) or cremation 
arrangements.   
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
Question 
  23.  I am confident that my agency 
can process and track disposition 
of fatalities through the Electronic 
Death Registration System 
(EDRS) during MFM. 





COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
    





 Note:  The use of a family 
assistance center in an 
environment of communicable 
disease and social distancing may 
not be feasible.   
 
26.  My jurisdiction is planning to 
implement supportive capabilities 
for families and communities that 
are flexible and appropriate to a 
communicable disease 
environment (i.e., virtual family 
support centers.) 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
Note:  The use of a family 
assistance center in an 
environment of communicable 
disease and social distancing may 
not be feasible.   
 
24.  My jurisdiction is planning to 
implement supportive capabilities 
for families and communities that 
are flexible and appropriate to a 
communicable disease 
environment (i.e., virtual family 
support centers.) 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
 
Question 
 27.  My jurisdiction has collected 
and/or prepared emergency public 
information and educational 
information related to MFM that 
will reduce disease exposure and 
protect families.   
25.  My jurisdiction has collected 
and/or prepared emergency public 
information and educational 
information related to MFM that 





COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree   
 
Question 
 28.  My jurisdiction has explored 
interventions and strategies 
regarding special populations as 
related to MFM (e.g., those with 
mental or behavioral illness or 
disabilities.) 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
26.  My jurisdiction has explored 
interventions and strategies 
regarding special populations as 
related to MFM (e.g., those with 
mental or behavioral illness or 
disabilities.) 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 





25.  I am confident that there are 
clear lines of communication and 
authority at the local, regional, and 
state levels to ensure the best 
possible outcome in MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
29.  I am confident that there are 
clear lines of communication and 
authority at the local, regional, and 
state levels to ensure the best 
possible outcome in MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
27.  I am confident that there are 
clear lines of communication and 
authority at the local, regional, and 
state levels to ensure the best 
possible outcome in MFM. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 




26.  Government leaders and 
public information officers in my 
jurisdiction are prepared to deliver 
30.  Government leaders and 
public information officers in my 
jurisdiction are prepared to deliver 
28.  Government leaders and 
public information officers in my 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 
COUNTY and CITY HEALTH 
COMMISSIONER GROUP 
honest and timely information to 
the community during MFM – 
before, during, and after the 
incident. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
honest and timely information to 
the community during MFM – 
before, during, and after the 
incident. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
honest and timely information to 
the community during MFM – 
before, during, and after the 
incident. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree 
    
Identification of 






27.  The best thing my jurisdiction 
has going in terms of Mass 
Fatality Management is: [ text 
box] 
31.  The best thing my jurisdiction 
has going in terms of Mass 
Fatality Management is: [ text 
box] 
29.  The best thing my jurisdiction 
has going in terms of Mass 





28.  The thing that worries me the 
most in terms of MFM is:  [text 
box] 
 
32.  The thing that worries me the 
most in terms of MFM in my 
jurisdiction is:  [text box] 
 
30.  The thing that worries me the 








30.  Years in Position [<5, 6-10, 
11-20, 21+]  
34.  Years in Position [<5, 6-10, 
11-20, 21+] 





  33.  Health Department Type 




COUNTY CORONER GROUP COUNTY EMERGENCY 
MANAGER GROUP 




31.  Professional Identification 
[Physician, Other (List)] 
35.  Professional Identification 
[Fire, Law Enforcement, City 
Planner, Other (List)] 
34.  Professional Identification 
Check all that apply.  [Physician, 
Dentist, Veterinarian, Nurse, 




32.  Age  [20-35, 36-50, 51-65, 
65+] 
36.  Age [20-35, 36-50, 51-65, 
65+] 





33.  HLS Region [NW, NE, SE1, 
SE2, SW, WC, Central] 
37.  HLS Region  [NW, NE, SE1, 
SE2, SW, WC, Central] 
36.  HLS Region  [NW, NE, SE1, 
SE2, SW, WC, Central] 
    
ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS 
34.  ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
[text box] 
38.  ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
[text box] 
37.  ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
[text box] 
Thank you message 
for End of Survey  
Thank you for completing the 
survey! 
Thank you for completing the 
survey! 





E. SURVEY COMMO EX - PRE-SURVEY NOTICE – INVITE 
 
 157
F. SURVEY COMMO EX – REMINDER 
 
 158




APPENDIX B.  SELECT SURVEY RESPONSES 
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